

**Al-Mesbar Studies &  
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Book**

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**Website:**

[www.almesbar.net](http://www.almesbar.net)

**Address:**

Gold and Diamond Park

Building 3

Sheikh Zayed Road, 4th

Interchange, Al-Quoz Industrial

Area 3

Dubai, United Arab Emirates

**Contact Information**

+971 4 380 4774 (phone)

+971 4 380 5977 (fax)

**Email:**

[info@mesbar.net](mailto:info@mesbar.net)



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Al Mesbar Studies & Research Centre

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