In its 190th monthly book, released October 2022 and titled Taliban Rule During the Year (2021-2022): Transformations – Neighborhood – Terrorism, the Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Center addresses the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in its first year. The book catalogs the reactions of states and other political actors in two tracks. The first focuses on the policies of Pakistan, India, Turkey, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Russia and China in Afghanistan. The second deals primarily with extremist movements such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the Muslim Brotherhood, in addition to various other regional extremist movements..
One study authored by Indian economic historian Tirthankar Roy sheds light on the formative stages and characteristics of the Afghan state, as well as the relationship between the ‘center’ and the ‘periphery’ regarding economic development. He begins with the history of imperial competition for influence, successive eras in which Afghanistan was subjected to a Persian sphere of influence (particularly the regions of Herat and Kandahar), to the Mongols (in Kabul, Ghazni, and Jalalabad), as well as an ongoing Central Asian influence in the country’s northern regions. Roy’s study focuses on the drive to modernization during the era of King Abdul Rahman Khan (1884-1901), as well as the changes after the third Anglo-Afghan war, when Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) wrested several key concessions from both internal and external rivals, while also demarcating Afghanistan’s modern borders. However, his efforts were brought to a halt by a coup d’état led by Tajik military commander Habibullah Kalakani, purportedly motivated by opposition to Amanullah Khan’s secularism. Nonetheless, Muhammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933) resumed the modernization project during his reign. During the years between 1950 and 1978, however, the modernization project found itself largely confined to the capital and other major urban areas, exacerbating a vast cultural gulf between the ‘center’ and peripheral areas that remained under the control of local leaders.
When civil war broke out following the overthrow of the last king of Afghanistan, Muhammad Zahir Shah, in 1973, the Afghan state entered into a period of seemingly permanent flux. Hitherto marginal political expressions came to the fore, venerating everything that appeared to stand opposed to what had been the country’s “center”. Thus, extremist ideologues, tribal leaders, and local chieftains fed on the wrath of the masses of the people against the State. As a result instability has become pervasive and chronic, both rooted in, and exacerbating a period of faltering development, the delayed repayment of foreign loans, and foreign interventions. Attempts to craft an enlightened Constitution failed, largely as a result of the resentments governing relations between the center and the periphery. Opposition towards most attempts at state-building remained strong. One researcher observes that Afghanistan is not a failed State so much as it is a composite state, with highly varied regional history and geography, which in turn creates an ideological diversity which complicates the work of consensual state-building.
Further elaborating the specificity of the Afghan situation, Russian researcher Leonid Savin (Леонид Савин) examines the internal mechanisms of the Taliban movement. His study touches upon the nature of its mutually reinforcing alliance with Al-Qa’eda, where the Taliban engaged external and internal forces to develop a well-structured client network. After examining both movements’ funding sources, Savin focuses on explaining the structural similarities between these two organizations (the Taliban and Al-Qa’eda) on the one hand, and the Bolsheviks and leftist rebel movements, on the other. He highlights their shared devotion to what they term “the armed struggle” and “the sacred”, as well as their aggressive pursuit of ideological opponents. Both maintained complex relationships with external players, and endeavored to gain international legitimacy after consolidating their areas of territorial control.
Some have contended that the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan may be mitigated by the movement’s supposed “moderation”, as evidenced by the fact that it had engaged with the Americans in protracted negotiations. Afghan researcher Noorulhoda Farzam seeks to test this claim, probing for signs of change in the Taliban’s approach to governance, as well as entertaining creative approaches for reaching a modus vivendi with the movement. She concludes that, while the Taliban have tended throughout their history to oscillate between flexibility and extremism, the latter element tends to remain dominant. Recent research has pointed toward an increasing ‘ideologization’ of the movement’s thinking curricula, and a tendency to brand whole swaths of hostile territory as infidels, a clear marker of Qutbist influence. Farzam also observes considerable rigidity in the Taliban’s posture toward women’s rights.
The Egyptian researcher and investigative journalist, Safaa Saleh, in her report from the heart of Afghanistan, draws a colorful portrait of live scenes from the capital before, during, and after its fall to the Taliban. The study captures the feelings of the residents and reflects their shock and the bitter disappointment felt by the women of Kabul and female employees, as the ramifications of Taliban rule set in. Saleh identifies substantial psychological and cultural differences between urban women and those whom she calls the ‘women of the mountains’. The researcher attributes these differences to the Taliban’s extremist bent, which seeks to impose the cultural mores of rural tribes on the city. The study includes two interviews with an Afghani activist for women’s rights, Mahbouba Siraj, and Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid. It also includes Saleh’s own impressions concerning the minimal opportunities permitted to women in the new era. Nor is the picture more hopeful when it comes to the opportunities available to followers of other religious sects, or even of the country’s various Sufi orders. All are enduring a period of contraction.
On the international front, and the influence of neighboring countries, the book begins with a comprehensive study of the Taliban’s diplomatic posture a year following the movement’s capture of Kabul. It focuses particularly on relations with Pakistan and China, and the impact on domestic economic policy, especially in light of Beijing’s investment inducements, and the importance of Afghanistan’s entry into the “Belt and Road” Initiative.
Sergey Vladimirovich Biryukov (Сергей Владимирович Бирюков) offers a Russian perspective towards Taliban rule, which begins with general observations about the exacerbation of internal Taliban disputes following the death of Mullah Muhammad Omar (1960-2013), against a backdrop of rivalry amid various Pashtun tribal elements. Biryukov contends that there is a split within the Taliban between branches led by Muhammad Yaqub, the son of its founder, Mullah Omar, another led by the Haqqani Network, a third represented by the Taliban’s Doha office, and still another that is represented by the movement’s “field commanders”. In Biryukov’s view, Moscow is willing to deal with one branch only.
Russian fears primarily stem from security grounds. In that regard, Konstantin Petrovich Kurylev (Константин Петрович Курылев), focuses on the influence of the war in Afghanistan exerts on terrorist movements in the Russian North Caucasus. He catalogs these movements and their ideological contours, their association with transnational groups such as al-Qa’eda and ISIS. Russian concerns stem from the potential nexus between the Taliban, extremist separatist movements in the North Caucasus, and the countries of Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan.
Tajik researcher Faridun Ibragimovich Usmonov, concentrates on how the region’s governments deal with terrorism. On a parallel track, Azerbaijani scholar Aghazada Mirmehdi Mirkamil Ogly explores Turkish influence in Afghanistan, noting that it is in line with Turkey’s “strategic depth” policy, whereby Ankara seeks to enhance its regional and global presence, and to cultivate a pressure card against the European Union, the United States, Russia and China. Ogly also takes note of Turkey’s endeavors – however cautious – to represent a people of Turkish origin in the government formed by the Taliban.
Chinese security concerns are centered on the issue of the Xinjiang region and perceived separatist tendencies within it. Potential links to that issue shape China’s policy towards Afghanistan. These concerns are addressed in the study by Chinese academic Wang Jin, who also dwells on economic affairs. He notes that, soon after the Taliban completed their conquest of the country, China received a delegation from the Taliban to discuss economic opportunities. In response, China dispatched hundreds of investors to Afghanistan in the successive weeks. Regarding the optics of engagement with a theocratic movement, Beijing takes few pains to conceal its pleasure at the check delivered to the expansion of “Western democracy” by force.
The security environment dominates both Indian and Pakistani perspectives on Afghanistan. Egyptian researcher Soheir Elsherbini suggests an interpretation of what defines the Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan. She focuses on cross-border tribal relationships and the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban, as well as the fear that Taliban control of Kabul would embolden other extremist movements to attempt similar conquests. The study also contextualizes Pakistan’s relationship with the Haqqani Network, and sketches a number of potential scenarios for the future of the Pakistani-Taliban relationship.
In order to understand the repercussions for India, which began with the relationship with opposition parties to the Taliban, researchers Tore Refslund Hamming and Abdul Sayed have assembled a history of the emergence of al-Qa’eda Indian affiliate (known as “Al-Qa’eda in the Indian Subcontinent” or AQIS), laid out its ideological foundations, and detailed its relationship with al-Qa’eda central. The study also lists prominent personalities who contributed to the establishment of AQIS — Osama Mahmoud, Asim Omar, Ahmed Farouk — and its attempt to operate across the entire territory of the Indian subcontinent. The two researchers attempt to sketch possible future scenarios based on AQIS’s statements and actions as well as those of the Taliban movement, specifically the Haqqani network. They emphasize common aspects of cooperation between the various groups, aiming to anticipate the future of the organization and the extent of the Taliban’s ability to control its movements.
The death of the former AQ central leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2022, in Kabul, within earshot of Taliban intelligence, indicates two things: the continuation of the Taliban-based relationship, and that the residence of terrorist elements can still be identified by counter-terrorism forces. Both factors required the Taliban to labor to create an alternative narrative of the event. Therefore, the book contains a compilation and analysis of the most prominent Western reports examining the Taliban’s positioning relative to the killing of Al-Zawahiri.
Regarding the future of al-Qaeda, Egyptian researcher Ahmed Fouad examines the vision of the most prominent candidate likely to take the reins of the terrorist organization following the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri. He probes this person’s intellectual influences, what led him to adopt takfirist Qutbi ideology, his relationship with the Brotherhood and certain elements within the Iranian regime, as well as his position on remaining in Afghanistan.
In conclusion, the Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Center extends its thanks to the researchers who participated in this book and the staff who helped publish it. We also extend our thanks and appreciation to Mr. Abdulah Bin Bijad Al Otaib , who proposed the project, and to our colleague Ahmed Loutfi Dahshan, who coordinated the issue. We hope that this book will fill a gap in the Arab library.
Editor-in-Chief
Omar al-Bashir al-Turabi
October 2022
