Following the terrorist attack that took place in the Austrian capital, Vienna, in 2020, the Austrian police launched one of their largest operations since 1945, known as Operation Luxor. The operation targeted individuals and organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in the country. However, despite the significant efforts made by the police and investigative authorities working on cases related to Islamism in Austria, most of these efforts did not yield substantial results, nor did they lead to a fundamental shift in confronting political Islam—contrary to the expectations of those who were optimistic about the campaign when it began.
Naturally, this campaign cannot be viewed in isolation from its surrounding context, nor from the broader developments and transformations taking place across European countries as a whole. These changes are driven by political, economic, and social factors and raise questions about counterterrorism and anti-extremism policies across the European continent, particularly in Austria.
A review of Austria’s counterterrorism and anti-extremism policies and strategies reveals notable successes, but also shortcomings in addressing certain threats, including the threat posed by political Islam through organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood or those that adopt its ideology. The challenges stem from several factors, including limited resources allocated to these operations and legal obstacles related to proving extremist crimes, tracking and deporting extremists from the country. This underscores the complexity of the situation, particularly in dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood.
In reality, this crisis is not unique to Austria. Other European countries that have launched campaigns against the Muslim Brotherhood, such as France and Germany, face similar challenges. The Brotherhood does not operate under its official name in these countries but instead infiltrates local Muslim communities under various names and slogans. Organizations operating within these communities deny any official affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, even though there are actual or personal ties between them—ties that are difficult to prove legally.
If one phrase accurately describes the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, it is “Public preaching, secret organization.” This has been a fundamental principle of the Brotherhood since the era of its founder, Hassan al-Banna, who established two structures within the movement: a relatively well-known general organization and a secret organization unknown even to leaders of the general organization. This clandestine wing, known as the Special Apparatus, served as the Brotherhood’s military arm in Egypt and remained active until it was dismantled by the campaign launched by former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s.
Ironically, the very campaign aimed at eradicating the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt led to its fragmentation and subsequent expansion into other countries, including European nations such as Austria. Prominent Brotherhood leaders—including Youssef Nada, the former Commissioner for International Relations of the Brotherhood, and Said Ramadan, the son-in-law of the Brotherhood’s founder and his personal secretary—were instrumental in establishing the first Brotherhood network in Austria. This effort was coordinated with the Mosque Construction Committee, a group of young Muslims who later transformed it into the Islamic Society of Germany, which became the umbrella organization for the Muslim Brotherhood in the country.
The Complex Networks of the Muslim Brotherhood in Austria
Since its establishment in Austria, the Muslim Brotherhood has operated without using its official name, instead founding a network of affiliated Islamic organizations and associations. Among the most prominent of these are the Islamic Association of Austria and the Islamic League for Culture. The Brotherhood has also established Islamic centers and charitable organizations engaged in humanitarian aid and fundraising, such as Al-Rahma Charity and others.
The Brotherhood’s objective in maintaining this intricate network is to create lobbying structures that encompass Islamic associations, cultural centers, mosques, and schools. Control over these institutions grants the Brotherhood influence within Muslim communities, which can, in turn, be translated into political power—whether through elections, protests, or other activities the organization orchestrates. Figures such as Mahmoud El-Ebiary, who serves as Secretary-General of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood and oversees global coordination, have played key roles in this structure. In Austria, leaders like Anas Schakfeh, the former president of Austria’s Islamic Religious Authority, were directly involved, though he was later acquitted after being targeted in Operation Luxor. Others, like Ayman Ali, formerly the imam of Al-Noor Mosque in Graz and later an advisor to former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, have also been part of this network. Similarly, Samir Abu Laban, a key figure in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, previously led the Islamic League for Culture in Austria.
Organizations linked to the Brotherhood in Austria have historically been connected to the Union of Islamic Organizations in Europe, now known as the Council of European Muslims. According to the internal regulations of the Brotherhood’s international structure, the president of the Islamic Association of Austria and the president of the Islamic League for Culture were automatically appointed to the Shura Council of the Union of Islamic Organizations in Europe. These Brotherhood-linked organizations in Austria also benefited from government policies that facilitated their expansion within the country’s Muslim community.
This network comprises thousands of individuals, including those who work within Brotherhood-affiliated associations, cultural centers, and businesses, as well as ordinary individuals bound by ideological allegiance to the movement. Despite its reach, the true extent of the Brotherhood’s network remains largely obscured. The organizations consistently deny formal ties to the Brotherhood, and the group itself does not maintain official membership lists. Members rarely declare their affiliation.
However, during the exceptional circumstances of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, some Brotherhood figures—such as Jamal Murad—openly admitted to their membership. At the time, the Brotherhood enjoyed unprecedented momentum and believed its vision of a global caliphate was within reach. Its leaders saw no need to conceal their affiliations—until the political climate shifted once again.
A Strategy of Concealment
In recent years, Brotherhood activists and operatives in Austria have deliberately obscured their activities and affiliations. This shift is a direct response to the Austrian authorities’ crackdown on Brotherhood-linked organizations both domestically and across Europe. The organization has relied on a series of defensive tactics, including changing the names of its affiliated organizations, replacing well-known leaders with lesser-known figures, and limiting the availability of information on official websites linked to Brotherhood-affiliated groups. These measures serve as a form of political survival. The Brotherhood, in many ways, behaves like a sponge—contracting under pressure and expanding when scrutiny eases.
Regional Events and the Brotherhood’s Strategic Adaptations
The significance of Brotherhood-affiliated organizations in Austria has grown in recent months, driven in part by the impact of the recent war in Gaza following the October 7, 2023 attacks. Some organizations linked to the Brotherhood—such as Al-Rahma Charity—have engaged in fundraising efforts, directing donations to Palestinians in Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon. These efforts indirectly support Hamas, the Palestinian movement affiliated with the Brotherhood. According to information obtained by the author from high-level sources within the Brotherhood, Bassem Naim, a senior Hamas official in its International Relations Office, privately urged Brotherhood leaders to intensify humanitarian support for Palestinians. The objective: to alleviate pressure on Hamas, which has suffered severe operational setbacks following the latest conflict.
Meanwhile, the Brotherhood in the Middle East is seeking to reassert itself on the political stage after years of decline. As part of this effort, the group is relying on its European branches to further its ambitions. Brotherhood operatives in Austria, for example, could play a role in exerting pressure on Arab governments that have taken a hardline stance against the movement.
An Internal Struggle for Control
Within the Brotherhood’s leadership, an intense power struggle is unfolding over control of its European networks—including its Austrian operations. Since 2020, the organization has fractured into three rival factions, though the split is organizational rather than ideological. The Secretary-General of the International Muslim Brotherhood Organization, the Head of the Brotherhood’s European Sector, and the Leader of the Egyptian Brotherhood’s Overseas Wing are all vying for influence. The latter believes that securing control over these organizations will grant it greater access to the financial resources generated by Brotherhood-linked networks throughout the continent.
This internal conflict underscores the continued strategic importance of Austria’s Brotherhood-affiliated organizations within the group’s broader global framework.
The Threat of the Muslim Brotherhood in Austria
The spread of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology within Austrian and broader European society remains a cause for concern—one that Austria’s and Germany’s domestic intelligence agencies have repeatedly warned about in recent years. European security officials fear that the Brotherhood’s influence could lead to cultural shifts within Muslim communities across the continent, undermining social cohesion, or fostering values that run counter to Western democracy.
Although organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, along with prominent figures within the movement, have repeatedly denied any intent to promote extremism in European societies, the rhetoric they propagate often carries the seeds of radicalization. Some of these organizations have provided platforms for hardline preachers from the Middle East. On April 10, 2024, for instance, Al-Salam Mosque shared a video featuring Eyad Qunaibi, a Jordanian Islamist associated with jihadist currents. This directly contradicts both the Brotherhood’s claims and the mosque’s own website, which states its opposition to hate speech and violence. Furthermore, the Brotherhood’s educational frameworks and organizational traditions are deeply rooted in a separatist mindset, viewing Western societies as jahiliyyah—a term signifying ignorance or unbelief.
Objectively assessing the Brotherhood’s threat to Austria’s internal security, it is clear that the organization does not pose the same immediate danger as violent groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda. Unlike these organizations, the Brotherhood and its affiliated institutions do not pursue an agenda of direct physical violence in the countries where they operate. Instead, they focus on building support networks and lobbying structures to advance their interests. However, this does not mean that the Brotherhood rejects the principle of physical violence. Its ideological literature emphasizes its necessity, a stance reflected in its official emblem—a Quran flanked by two swords. This ideological foundation makes the Brotherhood a potential gateway to more extreme forms of radicalization, posing a long-term risk to Austria’s national security and the broader stability of Europe.
Rethinking Austria’s Efforts to Counter the Muslim Brotherhood
Despite the persistent threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence, Austria’s policies to address it remain inadequate. The current strategy contains gaps that Brotherhood-affiliated organizations exploit to criticize the Austrian government and undermine its efforts.
Individuals and organizations linked to the Brotherhood in Austria have previously criticized the term political Islam, arguing that it is vague and primarily targets Muslims. They have also claimed that the Austrian police crackdown was an attack on civil liberties. Additionally, the term Islamophobia is frequently used to discredit measures taken against the Brotherhood across Europe, particularly in Austria. This underscores the need for the Austrian government and its Documentation Center for Political Islam to intensify efforts in clarifying that these initiatives are directed against extremist organizations—not against the Muslim community as a whole. Austrian Muslims are an integral part of the country’s social fabric, and their concerns must be acknowledged to prevent the Brotherhood from monopolizing the discourse on Muslim representation.
Brotherhood-linked organizations in Austria gained momentum when Austrian courts overturned most of the legal actions taken against individuals and entities targeted in Operation Luxor. The movement further benefited when the Vienna municipal government honored Anas Schakfeh, the former head of Austria’s Islamic Religious Authority, after he was acquitted of charges brought against him in the operation. These legal setbacks exposed flaws in Austria’s counter-extremism strategy and highlighted the insufficiency of evidence at the time. The Supreme Court and the Graz Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that the raids conducted under Operation Luxor were unlawful—bringing the issue of legal obstacles in countering extremism back to the forefront.
A more pressing concern is that Brotherhood-affiliated organizations portray Austria’s measures as a direct attack on Muslims themselves. They point to past government actions, particularly the amendments made in 2015 to Austria’s Islam Law—a legal framework dating back to 1912 that regulates the relationship between the Austrian state and its Muslim community. These amendments introduced stricter regulations on the appointment of imams and banned foreign funding for Islamic institutions. The government later went further, prohibiting the display of Brotherhood symbols, initiating procedures to shut down mosques that promoted radical rhetoric, and establishing a monitoring body for political Islam.
Brotherhood-linked organizations argue that these measures are designed to suppress Muslim religious institutions, restrict Islamic forums and mosques, and tighten asylum and immigration laws. Their claims resonate in some circles due to rising concerns about Austria’s far-right political movements, which have taken a hardline stance on immigration, asylum policies, and Islamic separatism.
Beyond the influence of the far-right, these organizations continue to gain traction because there is no viable alternative structure for Austrian Muslims. Although efforts have been made—such as the 2023 launch of the Islamic Forum in Austria, spearheaded by Mouhanad Khorchide alongside other Muslim leaders with support from the European Asylum and Migration Fund—the initiative remains largely elitist. It has faced criticism from Brotherhood-affiliated organizations, which claim it marginalizes the majority of Austrian Muslims. This rhetoric is intended to weaken the forum’s credibility within Austria’s Muslim community, revealing that efforts to reduce the Brotherhood’s dominance over Islamic institutions in the country remain insufficient.
