By Tommaso Virgili
The request addressed by some Arab states to Qatar to shut down the Al-Jazeera media network has ignited a heated debate. The channel, which is owned by the Qatari government, is definitely an important media giant, but has come under fire in the Middle East and in the West alike for allegedly spreading manipulated news to advance the Qatari political agenda, and for being the mouthpiece of radical Islamists, from Osama bin Laden onwards.
One of the most prolific and controversial Islamic scholars hosted on Al-Jazeera is surely Yusuf al-Qaradawi, probably the most influential theologian of the Muslim Brotherhood’s galaxy – that in the state of Qatar finds its main political and economic sponsor.
The notoriety and influence of Al-Qaradawi is such that even top-level officials from different Arab states have felt the urge to confront him directly, accusing him of providing an ideological mantle to jihadi terrorism. For the same reason, he is currently banned from entering the United States and the United Kingdom. Others, conversely, view him as a bulwark of moderation against extremism, to the extent that in 2004 he was even invited at London’s City Hall by then mayor Livingstone.
In this paper, I will address Al-Qaradawi’s main contents, and show that his alleged moderation is merely a reflection of the Muslim Brotherhood gradualism, while the substance of his ideology clearly reveals radical views and an Islamist agenda.
An Al-Azhar graduate, Al-Qaradawi was expelled from Egypt during Nasser’s era, and found safe haven in Qatar, where he has been living since the ‘60s, enjoying Qatari citizenship. A prolific Islamic scholar, he has written dozens of volumes on several topics pertaining to Islam, but it is mostly thanks to the web and even more to Al-Jazeera ‘s weekly program “Sharia and Life” that he has become a celebrity. He has also a marked foothold in powerful Islamic organizations worldwide, heading, among others, the Doha-based International Union of Muslim Scholars and the European Council for Fatwa and Research – de facto, Islamist umbrellas. The Sheikha of Qatar, Moza bint Nasser, has personally created a research center for the cleric – the Al-Qaradawi Centre for Islamic Moderation and Renewal, based in Doha.
From an ideological point of view, he belongs to the so-called wasatiyya, or “middle way”, “trend within Islamism, which rejects both Westernization and Islamist fanaticism and advocates a moderate – but still political – version of Islam”. In Al-Qaradawi’s own words, ” [Wasatiyya] represents a combination of Salafism and of renewal, an equilibrium between the fundamentals and change: the fundamentals of Islamic law and the change that occurs throughout time. […] This trend is not detached from the past, does not turn its back on the present, and does not neglect the future. Rather, it lives in the present, is inspired by the past and looks forward to the future”.
The scholar, in other words, views himself as a proponent of an Islam rejecting at once the excesses of secularism and religious extremism. It is not by chance that one of his most famous books is entitled “Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism”.
For this reason, as well as for accepting democracy and for considering the West dar al-da’wa (abode of predication) rather than dar al-harb (abode of war), he is regarded by many as a “moderate” – a possible bridge between the West and Islam.
However, many of his tenets show very little “moderation” – if this term has to mean something different from a tactical gradualism.
First of all, it is interesting to have a deeper look at what constitutes, in its view, the two “extremes” that must be fought. The “rejectionist”, in his discourse, is the Muslim who has surrendered to the logic of secularism – one who is alien to Islam, whose very nature is being a comprehensive reality (shumuliyya) embracing all aspects of private and public life. “Islam is one”, it is “Creed and Legislation, Worship and Leadership, Prayer and Jihad (fighting in Allah’s cause)”. “In order to be truly Islamic, society must commit itself to Islam in its totality rather than being like the Israelites, who adopted only parts of the Torah but ignored the rest”. Since Islam is a “comprehensive system of worship and legislation”, he states, “the acceptance of secularism means abandonment of Islamic law, a denial of divine guidance and a rejection of God’s injunctions”. Similarly, prohibiting something which is halal and permitting the haram is a form of shirk. As a consequence, “the call for secularism among Muslims is, in effect, atheism and a rejection of Islam, and its acceptance as a basis for rule in place of the law of Islam is out-and-out apostasy.” Although Qaradawi purports to reject takfirism, this is dowright takfiri logic on a wide scale: everybody who, albeit not reneging Islam, rejects sharia, is an apostate by default. And what does this entail, in its turn? Qaradawi does not beat around the bush on the point, and reiterates that apostasy from Islam encounters death penalty.
At the same time, he refrains from showing the same severity towards religious extremists, whom he basically considers “comrades who are in error” – to take an expression of leniency used for a long time by exponents of the Italian Communist party towards Red Brigades terrorists. Qaradawi describes extremists benevolently as devoted, albeit over-enthusiastic, youth of warm faith, to be treated “with paternal and brotherly love, letting them know that they belong to us and we to them and helping them to realize that they represent our hope for our own future and that of the Ummah”. The sheikh does not conceal his admiration towards “their love for truth and hatred of falsehood, their passion to disseminate the divine message, their determination to command the common good and forbid what is harmful, their zeal for jihad [struggling against oppression and corruption], their concern for Muslims everywhere in the world, and their aspiration to establish an Islamic society which lives in accordance with the teachings of God”. He goes as far as to qualify “this young generation, which has grown up on righteousness and piety” as “the real treasure upon which Egypt can build its hopes. Indeed they are more precious than any material considerations”.
What is the cause of the errors committed by these pious comrades, the best hope of Muslim societies? Qaradawi identifies it in the “irrelligious extremism” which has spread in Muslim countries, in the form of a moral laxity that, under the banner of “personal freedom”, has brought corruption to Islamic societies: “If society had taken a stand against those who were immoral and irreligious and had endeavored to change all the manifestations of evil, the phenomenon of religious extremism would have never emerged in our countries”.
In other words, according to the cleric, Islamist extremism is only a venial deviation wrought by “secular extremism” – the actual threat to Islam.
This is a recurring topos of the Qatari cleric, who has repeatedly urged Muslims to undertake jihad against un-Islamic governments. The Arab Spring represented to his eyes a key moment to finally achieve this objective. From Al-Jazeera’s pulpit, in January 2011, he urged Tunisians to revolt against an impious government, that he had condemned for its secularism back in 2001 in a book significantly titled “Extremist Secularism defying Islam: The model of Turkey and Tunisia”. After Mubarak’s ouster in Egypt, he praised Arab people for “doing the best jihad”. Not in the name of freedom, it goes without saying, but for the establishment of an Islamic state. For him, “Freedom is a part of sharia, that is, sharia enables people to be free and to practice freedom. […] Freedom is a part of religion and a part of sharia, this is the reason why we cannot say either sharia or freedom.” This wilful confusion of terms is part of a precise strategy meant to disguise controversial ideas behind internationally palatable terms (freedom, justice, equality, democracy, human rights), at the same time advancing an interpretation thereof compatible with sharia. In concrete terms, this means that invididual liberties are submitted to sharia, hence “it is not allowed to use the freedom of opinion to attack Islam and Muslims, spread atheism, cast doubts on Islamic values, or spread debauchery, as the freedom to corrupt society is something unacceptable by reason or law”.
There is no freedom outside the boundaries of sharia for the latter represents, in Al-Qaradawi’s discourse, the beginning and the end of legitimate governance and legislation. Sharia is “a complete rule over all political authorities including the body which enacts man-made laws. They have no right to change or suspend the rules of Shari’ah“, which are absolute and eternally valid. It is about a downright “legislative domination, […] supreme and absolute”. All Muslims are sinful until they achieve the Islamic rule.  They cannot be loyal and pay homage (baya) to any government that does not enforce sharia, and must continuously adopt any means at their disposal to achieve the Islamic rule, removing all obstacles on its way. The final objective is the construction of “a major Islamic state that unites all Muslims under the banner of the Qur’an and the Islamic Caliphate”, with a constitution derived from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. This implies the application of Islamic law in all its parts, including the hudud penalties providing for flogging, amputation and stoning. The approach, as per the classic Muslim Brotherhood tactic, must be gradual, but the final objective is never under discussion. In 2012, Qaradawi explicitly called for a gradual implementation of sharia in Egypt, including a moratorium on hands’ amputation “for the first five years”. This is part and parcel of a theoretical framework whereby even the criminal norms of sharia can never be abrogated, but only suspended until when society has reached 1) the proper establishment of social justice; 2) the sufficient level of Islamic maturity to implement them correctly. This idea is akin to Tariq Ramadan’s call for a “moratorium” on hudud to allow Muslims scholars to reach a consensus on their interpretation and application, and to establish the minimal socio-political conditions in Muslim societies to enforce them justly. Al-Qaradawi never questions the superiority of Islamic law, as traditionally interpreted and applied, over the secular onem – no matter the clash with modern sensitivities and human rights. In fact, according to him, modern coercive measures such as imprisonment would be neither an effective deterrent nor a sufficient punishment; he even mocks those who raise human rights concerns about death penalty or amputation. This unconditional preference for Islamic rules entails extreme consequences, which the scholar has repeatedly outlined in his writings and during his sermons on Al-Jazeera. He has clearly stated that sharia is indivisible, hence it must be applied in all its part, including by flogging fornicators and alcohol drinkers, amputating the right hand of thieves, cutting off hand and foot on the opposite sides of those who wage war against Allah. Similarly, he has not hesitated to demand that homosexuals be harshly punished or even killed, whether as fornicators, or by burning them, or by throwing them from a high place (in fact the penalty preferred by the Islamic State). He has also endorsed female genital mutilation, a practice that, albeit not obligatory, he said to “support” “under the current circumstances of the modern world”.
The state that implements sharia is intrinsically superior, in Qaradawi’s view, to a democratic one. Democracy is acceptable only inasmuch as it is intended as shura (participation) in a state whose “rule is only for Allah”, not for citizens, and which conformingly rejects “every law or system that contradicts the details of Islamic law”. No vote or debate is admitted on the fixed rules of Islam. In parallel, “it is illegal to establish parties defending apostasy, anarchism or irreligiousness or to attack Divine creeds in general and Islam in particular”, or that “scorns the sacrosanct in Islam whether its creed, jurisprudence, the Qur’an or its Prophet”. What remains is just a simulacrum of a democracy, maintained in some of the procedural aspects without the substantive ones, in the framework of a religious caliphate.
It should come at this point as no surprise that the Doha-based International Union of Muslim Scholars, while condemning ISIS, has also reaffirmed that the establishment of a caliphate remains Muslims’ deepest aspiration, adding that “it is inevitable that we will establish countries that will be governed by Islamic shari’a”.
Violence, in this picture, is to be considered the principal way to achieve the objective, when feasible. Each and every Muslim is called by Qaradawi to fight what is evil in the eyes of Allah and his law, first “by hand”, then “by tongue” if one is unable to do it by force, and finally “from the heart, when one is incapable of doing neither of the first two stages”. The only precondition is that “the evil that a Muslim must change by force must be firmly ascertained by the consensus of Muslim scholars”. In describing the acts of some “over-enthusiastic youths” who had smashed toy stores and restaurants open during a time they erroneously believed Ramadan, the scholar does not criticize them for the violence and illegality of their actions, but merely for not having ascertained with a more competent religious authority whether a violation of sharia had actually occurred. Hence, “this error of judgment of sincerely devout youth must not be resisted by bullets, but rather by convincing them of their error”. If consensus exists over the evil-doing, change must be enforced, as per the hisba principle.
What happens if it is materially impossible to enact the Islamic rule by force? In that case, and only as a last resort, Muslims must be patient and resilient, and adopt a more subtle approach: da’wa. Although Al-Qaradawi owes much of his reputation as a moderate Islamic voice to his focus on predication as opposed to jihad, it clearly emerges from his writings that this is anything but a tactical expedient, in conformity with Hasan al-Banna’s teachings. Three elements are necessary, in his view, to enact a change by force: the army, the Parliament and “sweeping public force”, meant as revolutionary wave. Whoever does not possess one or any of these powers, “has to resort to patience and perseverance. In addition, he must hold fast and strengthen himself until he reaches them. His duty is to try to change evil-doing through words, writing, Da’wah, illuminating and instructing until he creates a sweeping call for changing evil-doing”. Hence, da’wa is not an instrument of dialogue, but yet another instrument of conquest, in the framework of the Muslim Brotherhood’s gradualist tactic. It is not by chance that, in his treaty on jihad (Fiqh al-Jihad), he describes media and communication outlets as weapons of a new “jihad of the age”. The soldiers of this non-armed war are Muslims living in the West, who are called, on the one hand, not to integrate, remaining inside parallel but separate communities immune from the poison of Western values and mores – downright ghettos where they must have “their own religious, educational and even entertainment institutions”; on the other hand, they must infiltrate the social and political infrastructures of Western societies, in order to subvert them from within. This process will pass through the creation of a pro-Islamic environment at the bottom level, the attainment of high-level positions of Muslims in order for them to act from above, and finally, in a slow pincer, the accomplishment of the Islamization of the West.
In a video broadcast on Qatar TV in 2007, he provides a practical example of what this da’wa aims to achieve. Addressing a hadith on Islam’s conquest of Rome, he says: “The conquest of Rome – the conquest of Italy, and Europe – means that Islam will return to Europe once again. Must this conquest necessarily be though war? No. There is such a thing as peaceful conquest. […]The peaceful conquest has foundations in this religion, and therefore, I expect that Islam will conquer Europe without resorting to the sword or fighting. It will do so by means of da’wa and ideology.” Da’wa is the tool to enact the conquest of Europe, thereby saving it from its “miserable” condition, its “immorality”, “raging materialism”, horrifying “promiscuity, which permits men to marry men and women to marry women”. In other words, a slow, non-armed penetration of Islamism is doomed to terminate Western freedom, and to replace it with the Caliphate’s rule.
Yet, as explained above, da’wa is only a secondary tool, to be used where force is not feasible. Jihad remains the best struggle in other contexts. From a theoretical point of view, it must be stressed that Qaradawi promotes a concept of defensive jihad, in contrast with the ideologues of preemptive jihad. This entails that he does not share the most radical theory, supported among others by Sayyid Qutb and al-Mawdudi, that killing infidels is always a good deed, even if non-believers have brought no harm to Muslims. However, his concept of “attack on Muslims” is dangerously flexible. Throughout his writings, one can find the recurring theme of an Islamic world under attack by a plethora of anti-Islamic forces (Jews, crusaders, liberals, communists, “hypocrites”…), as well as victimization of Muslims in Western lands, that he depicts under constant threat of “Westernization”. Against this backdrop, the boundaries of “defensive jihad” become blurred: do liberal intellectuals in Muslim lands represent an attack against Islam? Are cartoons mocking the Prophet an attack against Islam? Are there protected civilians among the “enemies” of Islam, or are they all fair targets for jihad?
Al-Qaradawi has not refrained from providing clear answers to these questions. As we have seen, he calls all liberal Muslims “apostates” who deserve death, not confining this belief to pure theory: when asked about the assassination of the Egyptian secularist author Farag Foda, far from condemning the killing he rather denounced the writer as one of “those for whom being apostates is not enough and seek to propagate apostasy”. In the aftermath of the Danish cartoons affair, he publicly launched a death fatwa, broadcast from Qatari state television, against the Danish cartoonists. Furthermore, he has notoriously justified suicide operations against Israeli and Syrian civilians. In 2012, he sanctioned martyrdom operations in Syria, even if they might involve civilians, as long as the group undertaking the attack deemed them necessary. In 2003, during the 11th session of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, Qaradawi decreed that “The martyrdom operations carried out by the Palestinian factions to resist the Zionist occupation are not in any way included in the framework of prohibited terrorism, even if the victims include some civilians”. This happens because in Israel everybody is a reservist, therefore there are no civilians. Even an “innocent child” is an acceptable, albeit not intended, casualty in what he described a “jihad of necessity”. He has reiterated the same concepts on Al-Jazeera and BBC, adding that he considers “this type of martyrdom operation as an evidence of God’s justice”. Although he has recently recanted the permission of conducting suicide attacks, due to the increased military capacities of Palestinians, he has not reverted his position on legitimately targeting Israeli civilians.
This may actually be read in a context that goes far beyond anti-Zionism and political resistance against Israel, and may be framed instead as downright anti-Semitism – another mark of Qaradawi’s ideology. He has attacked Jews multiple times, whether for their implicit support for Israel, which would characterize most Jews worldwide, or on the basis of Qur’anic texts describing Jews as the worst enemies of Muslims. During his Al-Jazeera show he once addressed the “‘treacherous Jews” and said ‘Oh Allah, take this profligate, cunning, arrogant band of people… do not spare a single one of them. Oh Allah. Count their numbers, and kill them, down to the very last one’.” He has even gone thus far as to profess his admiration for Hitler, describing the Holocaust as the punishment sent by Allah against Jews for their corruption, and expressing the hope that the next Holocaust would be “at the hand of the believers”.
In conclusion, Yusuf al-Qaradawi is far from being a moderate voice of Islam. Through the megaphone of Al Jazeera and a vast network of websites and organizations worldwide, heavily supported by Qatar, he is spreading a divisive and radical ideology. He espouses a rigid reading of sharia law which excludes any possible innovation to make it conform to international human rights standards. He propagates a takfiri version of Islam that excommunicates any Muslims who do not adhere to this conservative and politicized understanding of religion. He advances the radical design of the Muslim Brotherhood whose goals and tactics he fully embraces. Hence, he supports pacific means and rejects jihad only inasmuch as this is functional to achieving the ultimate goal: a global state ruled by sharia law.
We should be wary of these ideologues and of whoever sponsors them. They will never be credible peace promoters, and they will always try to suffocate those Muslim voices who, without the same powerful means and at the cost of severe personal risks, strive to reconcile Islam with freedom.
 Tamara Qiblawi and Larry Register, ‘Arab States Issue List of Demands to Qatar’, CNN, 27 July 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/23/middleeast/gulf-nations-qatar-demands/index.html.
 ‘Gulf Officials Blast Sheikh Yousuf Al-Qaradawi: He Is The “Mufti Of Suicide Attacks,” Should Be Prosecuted’, MEMRI, 19 July 2016, https://www.memri.org/reports/gulf-officials-blast-sheikh-yousuf-al-qaradawi-he-mufti-suicide-attacks-should-be-prosecuted.
 ‘Muslim Cleric Not Allowed into UK’, BBC News, 7 February 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7232398.stm.
 Martyn Frampton and Shiraz Maher, ‘Between “Engagement” and a “Values-Led” Approach: Britain and the Muslim Brotherhood from 9/11 to the Arab Spring’, Al-Mesbar Center (blog), 3 October 2014, http://mesbar.org/paper/engagement-values-led-approach-britain-muslim-brotherhood-911-arab-spring/.
 For years, the call-in show was one of the network’s most popular.
 Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, ‘Al-Qaradawi Center for Islamic Moderation and Renewal’, archive.is, 1 November 2015, http://archive.is/v00w9.
 Ana Belén Soage, ‘Sheikh Yūsuf Al-Qaradawi: A Moderate Voice from the Muslim World?’, Religion Compass 4, no. 9 (1 September 2010): 563.
 Soage, 566.
 “Islam is a comprehensive system of life. It invests life with a sublime character and guides it in an ethical direction; it sets up the framework, the landmarks, and the limits which govern life’s movement and goals, thereby protecting it from going off track. For this reason, Islam consists of beliefs to enrich the mind, acts of worship to purify the heart, morals to purify the soul, legislation to establish justice, and manners to enhance life”. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism (London: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2007), 87.
 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, State in Islam (Cairo: Al-Falah Foundation, 2004), 4.
 al-Qaradawi, 3.
 al-Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism, 87.
 al-Qaradawi, 76.
 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam (Cairo: Al-Falah Foundation, 2001), 14.
 al-Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism, 76.
 al-Qaradawi, 31. ff.
 Al-Qaradawi on OnIslam, cit. in Mohamad Azmi Bin Haji Mohamad, ‘European Islam and Reform: A Comparative Study of the Theologies of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and Tariq Ramadan’ (University of Birmingham, 2015), 145. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Introduction to Islam (Cairo: Islamic Inc., 1995), 156.
 al-Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism, 90.
 al-Qaradawi, 91. Parentheses in the text.
 al-Qaradawi, 92.
 al-Qaradawi, 93.
 al-Qaradawi, 94.
 Valentina Colombo, Tunisia: A Nascent Democracy under Siege (Brussels: European Foundation for Democracy, 2015), 26, http://europeandemocracy.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Tunisia-a-nascent-democracy-under-siege.pdf.
 Valentina Colombo, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood versus Liberals: A Commentary’, European Foundation for Democracy, 20 July 2011, http://europeandemocracy.eu/2011/07/the-muslim-brotherhood-versus-liberals-a-commentary/.
 Haji Mohamad, ‘European Islam and Reform’, 71.
 al-Qaradawi, Introduction to Islam, 157.
 al-Qaradawi, State in Islam, 47.
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 al-Qaradawi, State in Islam, 87.
 al-Qaradawi, 13.
 al-Qaradawi, State in Islam, 38.
 al-Qaradawi, 23.
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 Clarion Project, ‘Special Report: The Muslim Brotherhood’, ed. Elliot Friedland, June 2015, 13, https://clarionproject.org/muslim-brotherhood-special-report/.
 Haji Mohamad, ‘European Islam and Reform’, 141. al-Qaradawi, Introduction to Islam, 111.
 Tariq Ramadan, ‘An International Call for Moratorium on Corporal Punishment, Stoning and the Death Penalty in the Islamic World’, 5 April 2005, https://tariqramadan.com:443/an-international-call-for-moratorium-on-corporal-punishment-stoning-and-the-death-penalty-in-the-islamic-world/.
 Sharia and Life, ‘الحدود في الخطاب الفقهي المعاصر’, Al-Jazeera, 4 January 2011, http://www.aljazeera.net/home/Getpage/0353e88a-286d-4266-82c6-6094179ea26d/1033246e-121f-4e87-927b-8116d8b9e544.
 ” One finds it absurd that some misinformed people call for the abrogation of capital punishment out of concern over the life of the poor murderer! What about the poor murdered victim and his poor kinsmen first of all and what about the society as a whole? Another absurdity is raised in relation to the concern over the precious hand of the thief which would be cut off if he committed larceny. This thief knew before hand murdered, what would happen to him if he/she stole, yet he did not have mercy on himself or on his fellow people. He did not care, but threatened the security of the community and was ready to kill and terrorize women and children to get what he wanted, in the hope that he would get away with his crime. What mercy does such a person deserve?” al-Qaradawi, Introduction to Islam, 116.
 Sharia and Life, ‘الحدود في الخطاب الفقهي المعاصر’.
 ‘Qaradawi on Homosexuals’, Youtube, 27 January 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NxnVSnnZs0Q.
 ‘Islamic Ruling on Female Circumcision’, IslamOnline, accessed 20 November 2017, https://archive.islamonline.net/?p=6646.
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 al-Qaradawi, State in Islam, 175.
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 Marc Lynch, ‘Qaradawi’s Revisions’, Foreign Policy, 9 July 2009, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/07/09/qaradawis-revisions/.
 He describes Muslims who integrate into Western societies as “salt melting into the water”, equating their becoming to losing their Muslim identity. Haji Mohamad, ‘European Islam and Reform’, 66.
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 Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, ‘What Is New about Al-Qaradawi’s Fiqh of Jihad?’, Islamopedia Online, 21 June 2011, http://www.islamopediaonline.org/editorials-and-analysis/what-new-about-al-qaradawi%E2%80%99s-fiqh-jihad.
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 Magdi Abdelhadi, ‘Controversial Preacher with “Star Status”’, BBC News, 7 July 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3874893.stm.
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 Soage, ‘Sheikh Yūsuf Al-Qaradawi’, 570.
 Najah Alotaibi, ‘How Do You Solve a Problem like Al Jazeera?’, Al Arabiya, 11 July 2017, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/07/11/How-do-you-solve-a-problem-like-Al-Jazeera-.html.
 ‘Sheik Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi: Allah Imposed Hitler upon the Jews to Punish Them – “Allah Willing, the Next Time Will Be at the Hand of the Believers”’, MEMRI – The Middle East Media Research Institute, 28 January 2009, https://www.memri.org/tv/sheik-yousuf-al-qaradhawi-allah-imposed-hitler-upon-jews-punish-them-allah-willing-next-time-will.