One of the regions in the world that best exemplified the transformation of policy focus due to the United States (U.S.)’ counterterrorism campaign is Southeast Asia. Prior to the events of 11th September 2001, the Southeast Asian states had considered terrorism merely as a form of criminal activity. The U.S. global war on terrorism brought a subsequent shift in the ASEAN member states’ policy on terrorism. In the post September 11th era, terrorism prevails as the region’s dominant security threat. In this region part of the relative success of the U.S. to persuade the ASEAN member states to join the war on terrorism can be attributed to its multi-pronged strategy. As part of its global effort to gather allies in the war on terrorism the U.S. embarked on multilateral, regional, and bilateral counter-terrorism strategies in Southeast Asia. This chapter will assess close to two decades of the U.S. multi-pronged counter-terrorism cooperation strategy in Southeast Asia. It will elaborate the U.S. counter-terrorism cooperation at multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels with countries in the region. This chapter argues that the most successful form of cooperation between the U.S. and Southeast Asian countries takes place at bilateral and regional levels because cooperation at these levels brought substantial benefits and posed low costs of cooperation to countries in the region. Bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation that is voluntary in nature has also paved the way for practical initiatives between the U.S. and countries in the region. This chapter also explains that U.S. – Southeast Asia cooperation initiatives conducted through the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also met with greater acceptance by the majority of countries in the region in comparison to U.S. led multilateral initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative. The evidence shows that the ASEAN led counter-terrorism cooperation initiatives do not require states to make substantial changes and provide benefits in form of equipment, information sharing, and capacity building. This is important for policy makers and negotiators who seek to expand counter-terrorism cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. It is vital that they understand that in order to ensure the success of cooperation the absolute gains should be sufficient to entice Southeast Asian countries to cooperate.
Key words: Southeast Asia, ASEAN, the United States, counter-terrorism
Collectively, Southeast Asian countries are the 11th largest economy and fourth largest exporter for manufactured products, services and technology in the world. The region’s vast maritime area includes three important Sea Lanes of Communication that connected the centre of the world economic corridors: Europe and East Asia, Australia and East Asia and the Persian Gulf and Japan. Given its importance the security dynamics in Southeast Asia is important for the international community.
Prior to the 9/11 attacks terrorism was not perceived as a prominent threat to either national or regional security. In ASEAN documents, published before September 11th, 2001 terrorism is only subsumed under the heading of transnational crime, together with drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering and high sea piracy. The U.S. global war on terrorism campaign generated a substantial shift in both the definition of and priority given to security in many countries, including those in Southeast Asia. The governments of ASEAN states such as Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have found it necessary to cooperate with the U.S. in its counterterrorism efforts. Cooperation between the U.S. and Southeast Asian countries progressed rapidly as the U.S. Department of Defense depicted Southeast Asia as a crucial front in the war on terror.
This chapter will explain how the U.S. persuaded Southeast Asian countries to cooperate in the global war on terror, the challenges the U.S. faces when cooperating in this region, and the relative success of US-Southeast Asia bilateral and regional counterterrorism cooperation. Before addressing these areas the chapter will first explain the threat posed by terrorism in the region to understand the scope of problem. The next part of this chapter will explain the U.S. multi-pronged counter-terrorism strategy in Southeast Asia. This section will begin by explaining the U.S. efforts to promote the U.S. led multilateral initiatives and accounting for the varying responses from Southeast Asian countries. These multilateral initiatives include the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Regional Maritime Security, and the Container Security Initiative. It then will proceed with explanation of the U.S.-Southeast Asia counter-terrorism cooperation at regional and bilateral levels. The final part of this chapter will highlight key points to take away from this chapter.
The Threat of Terrorism
After the 9/11 attacks the international concern over terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia intensified after a series of attacks took place in various countries in the region. In Indonesia this included two suicide bomb attacks in Bali, in 2002 and 2005; a bomb attack against the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003; a car bomb outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004; simultaneous bomb attacks at the Marriott and the Ritz Carlton Hotels, Jakarta in 2009; a number of assaults on police in 2010 and a series of bomb attacks in 2011 that targeted a number of public figures in Jakarta.
The 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people focused attention on the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) network operation in the region. JI is the largest jihadist organisation in Southeast Asia. In 2002 it had over 2000 members. Following the 2002 bombings governments in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, have intensified their counter-terrorism efforts and managed to unravel large terrorist networks such as JI. By May 2003 as a result of Indonesia’s counter-terrorism operations the arrest of the bombing suspects and members of the JI had reached 33 people. By 2013 the Indonesian police have arrested more than 900 suspects and prosecuted 600 of them. However, fifty Islamic boarding school (pesantrens) that are loosely affiliated to JI are still operating in various parts of Indonesia. These pesantrens only accounts for 0.25 per cent of total pesantrens in Indonesia, however, these places serve both as favourable destinations for JI members to send their children and as sanctuary for fugitive mujahidin who seeks refuge from the law enforcement forces.
In August 2001 the Malaysian police detained thirteen Muslims, many of them are affiliated with Partai Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) including the son of PAS Chief Minister in Kelantan. These men were arrested because the government believed they had received jihad or military training in Afghanistan. The government described them as members of the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, an extremist group that was deemed responsible for robberies, bombing and arson of churches and murder. The Malaysian government also made available video testimony of Malaysian JI members to the Indonesian government during the trial of Abu Bakar Bashir, an alleged spiritual leader of the JI member in Jakarta.
In Singapore in December 2001 the police detained 15 terrorist suspects. Following up on the evidence gained from the first arrest, the second wave of arrests in August 2002 detained 21 more suspected members of JI. The government reported that terrorists planned to target Singaporean facilities including the waterworks, Changi Airport, and projects on Jurong Island. By March 2013 Singapore had detained 64 persons for their participation in terrorism-related activities.
Terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia do not only takes place in land. In the Philippines on February 27th, 2004 the Abu Sayyaf Group exploded the MV Super Ferry in the Sulu Sea causing the death of 116 of the 900 passengers and crew. In 2016 alone militant groups from the southern parts of the Philippines kidnapped 28 people, 14 of them Indonesian, from fishing boats, tugs, barges, and merchant ships in this area. In 2017 the International Maritime Bureau reported that despite reductions in piracy attacks around the world, maritime kidnappings at the Sulu sea reached the highest recorded in the past ten years, with waters off the southern part of the Philippines becoming increasingly dangerous. Members of the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), a Southeast Asian based terror networks, and other Islamic militant groups also used the Sulu-Sulawesi waterways to travel from Kalimantan Timur (Indonesia), to Sabah (Malaysia), Tawi-Tawi (the Philippines) and then proceed to Mindanao (the Philippines).
At present the radical ideas propagated by the Islamic State (IS) is also generating significant concern for the Philippines, Indonesian, Singaporean and Malaysian authorities. It is estimated that over 15,000 foreign fighters from 81 countries, including Southeast Asian countries, have travelled to fight in Syria and Iraq since 2011. There are 514 Indonesians, around 30 to 40 Malaysians, and one Singaporean fighting alongside IS in the Middle East. It is expected that the return of IS fighters from the Middle East will likely to strengthen radicalisation campaign in the region. According to the Indonesian Police Watch data by August 2014 terrorist prone areas in the archipelago have widely extended to include Sulawesi Tenggara, Jakarta, Aceh, North Sumatera, Klaten, Solo, East Java, Bima, Maluku and Papua.
Multi-pronged Cooperation Strategy
After the end of the Cold War the U.S. ‘hub-and-spoke’ system was deemed as effective in deterring security threat and maintaining stability in Asia. In this system the U.S. served as a hub which developed bilateral security alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia; and was backed by forward-stationed and forward-deployed armed forces. The 9/11 attacks created urgency for the U.S. to create new security web in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia, a region where the U.S had fairly limited security engagement since its withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. Efforts to gather Southeast Asian countries to support the war on terror were carried out through multilateral, regional, and bilateral channels.
The United States Led Multilateral Initiatives
The majority of the U.S. led multilateral cooperation initiatives – such as the Container Security Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative – that it sought to promote in Southeast Asia are designed to identify and intercept maritime terrorist threats way before they reach the U.S. Although in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the U.S. focused on the security of air transport, however, soon after it began to turn to the vulnerability of port facilities and marine transport to terrorist attacks. The U.S. began to express its concern that “Muslim extremist in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand” as a possible threat to world trade navigating through Southeast Asian waterways.
The Container Security Initiative (CSI)
The CSI was introduced by the U.S. in 2002 and came into effect in January 2003. The main purpose of the initiative is to increase security for containerised cargo shipped to the U.S. from around the world by targeting and pre-screening the containers before they reach U.S. ports. The CSI requires government to allow the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to place teams of U.S. officers from both the CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to jointly work with host foreign government counterparts in pre-screening containers bound for U.S. ports, purchase pre-screening equipment and radiological and nuclear detection devices, build IT infrastructure to support the implementation of the initiative and provide a full descriptions of the cargoes 24 hours in advance of its scheduled arrival in U.S. ports, and share critical data, intelligence and risk management information with the U.S. CBP.
After the launch of the CSI the U.S. carried out diplomatic persuasion and lobbying in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, despite U.S. efforts not all Southeast Asian countries participate in this initiative. As of August 2019, there are four CSI ports in Southeast Asia located in three countries: Singapore (Port Singapore), Malaysia (Port Klang and Port Tanjung Pelepas), and Thailand (Port Laem Chabang). By participating as a CSI port, states will gain economic benefits, allowing containers shipped to ‘quickly enter into commerce in the United States’. If a terrorist attack takes place, containers coming from CSI ports will be given ‘special continuity considerations’ and ‘received facilitated handling at ports of entry’. Incentives of cooperation offered by the CSI could be economically rewarding for a state that serve as a regional hub for container transport such as Singapore and Malaysia. However, it is less appealing for countries that rely on trans-shipment such as Indonesia. The businesses export activities from Indonesia to the U.S. could be made through trans-shipment via CSI ports including Singapore, Port Kelang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia. Over 75 per cent of containers from Indonesia bound to the U.S. were already trans-shipped through Singapore. The strict legal requirements under the CSI were also deemed very intrusive. These requirements include the placement of the U.S. Customs team and periodic assessment in CSI operational ports. Concerns over possible additional economic costs including providing compensation for shippers if delay occurs and purchase of new equipment to share information and target high risk containers that meet the CSI minimal requirements have also hindered Southeast Asian countries participation in this initiative.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
President George W. Bush announced the PSI on May 31st, 2003 in Cracow, Poland. The PSI does not state fixed requirements for participating states. A state can choose to participate in various ways. These options range from taking part in PSI training exercises, identifying specific national assets that might contribute to PSI activities, providing consent to other states to board and search its flagged vessels to taking part in actual PSI operation to intercept vessels flying their flag in internal waters or territorial seas or areas beyond the territorial seas of other state that suspected of carrying the WMD-related cargoes. Member states of the PSI form the Operational Expert Group (OEG) in managing cooperation activities among them. This body meets periodically to ‘develop operational concepts, organise the interdiction exercise programme, share information about national legal authorities, and pursue cooperation with key industry sectors’. The OEG consists of experts from the defence, foreign affairs, law enforcement, transport and other agencies of PSI countries. The U.S. has proposed the initiative; contributed military, customs, law enforcement, and other security experts and assets to interdiction exercises; hosted PSI meetings, workshops, and exercises with other PSI-endorsing states; and worked to improve other participants’ counter proliferation capacity.
The PSI generates varying responses across countries in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries that endorsed the PSI Interdiction Principles include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Indonesia, the largest archipelagic country in the region whose territories overlap with three Sea Lanes of Communications, rejected the initiative. This was because for Indonesia the PSI poses high sovereignty costs. Although it does not provide mandatory requirements or require a state to accept a third party in their decision making process the PSI can limit Indonesia’s rights in controlling security over their waters as granted by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. If Indonesia joined the arrangement and chose not to join any interdiction activities the government would still need to answer to its cooperation partners, primarily the U.S.’ demands to cooperate if suspected vessels were registered under the Indonesian flag or navigating through Indonesian waters. Such incidents could create legal precedents that challenge Indonesia’s rights as a costal state or a flag state to maintain full control over the security of its waters and ships registered under its flag. Interdiction may also cause additional economic costs because of delays to shipments or damage of goods; particularly in the case of a false alert. An Indonesian government official closely involved in maritime affairs explained that ‘most actions conducted under the PSI framework are based on intelligence information that is sometimes inaccurate. If an act of interdiction takes place on board a ship and the Indonesian government is charged for any delay or damage resulting from the interdiction who would compensate the shippers’.
The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI)
In 2003, the U.S. Pacific Command, working with the Department of State, started conceptual discussion with countries in the Asia-Pacific on the development of the RMSI. The U.S. initiated this cooperation programme partly due to perceived ‘slowness in the implementation of concrete measures to address transnational maritime threats’. The U.S. used its diplomatic leverage to begin discussion of the RMSI with the littoral states of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The initiative requires states to share information on maritime threats, standardise procedures for decision making processes, enhance interception capacity and synchronise international cooperation among agencies and ministries in the Asia-Pacific to address terrorism, armed robbery against ships, piracy and other transnational threats. As part of the information sharing activities member states needed to forward maritime data to the U.S. Pacific Command to obtain a real time maritime picture. The U.S. Department of State had proposed to allocate US$ 2 billion to finance the implementation of the RMSI. After the RMSI negotiations Indonesia and Malaysia declined to join the initiative.
The rejection of Indonesia and Malaysia to join the RMSI was often associated with the statement made by Admiral Fargo before the Congress. In a Congressional hearing on March 31st, 2004, Admiral Fargo explained that as part of the RMSI, the U.S. was ‘looking at things like… putting Special Operations Forces on high-speed vessels, potentially putting Marines on high-speed vessels…to conduct effective interdiction’. In order to clarify media reports, U.S. officials including the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph L. Boyce, the U.S. Charge d’Affaires, Embassy of the United States of America in Malaysia, John Medeiros, and the U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld explained to the media that the U.S. had no plan to deploy troops in the Straits of Malacca as part of the RMSI. According to Ambassador Boyce, Fargo’s statement was purely hypothetical. The U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, during his visit to Indonesia in June 2004, felt it necessary to emphasise the U.S. stand over RMSI. Rumsfeld suggested that there were no plans for the U.S. to send standing forces or set up a military base in the Straits.
Concerns that the U.S. would send its naval vessels to patrol the Straits as cited in national and foreign media were not the only main reason Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia refused to join the RMSI. As a former Indonesian MoD official that took part in the formulation of Indonesia’s policy on the RMSI explained that the administration understood that direct patrols by the U.S. Marines were not part of the cooperation activities that Washington offered to Indonesia. The RMSI, however, was perceived as overtly militaristic by decision makers and generated strong public opposition in Indonesia. Amris Hassan, Chairman of Commission I (Foreign Affairs Commission), House of Representative and also a member of the opposition party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), categorised the initiative as an act of intervention and violation of Indonesia’s sovereignty. Senior politicians in Indonesia’s main Islamic party, the United Development Party (PPP), also shared this view. Aisyah Aminy, a senior politician from the PPP, warned the U.S. not to intervene in Indonesia’s sovereign territory and declared a readiness to support an increase in the military budget to improve naval capacity. Non-participation in the RMSI would avoid any possibility for governments from being seen as aligning too closely with the U.S. by the public. In addition, there was a concern raised by the Indonesian Navy and Maritime Security Coordinating Board that taking part in the RMSI could provoke a backlash from radical elements in Indonesia and make the Straits of Malacca a more desirable target for both Al Qaeda and JI.
In summary the U.S. led multilateral initiatives were met with varying responses by Southeast Asian countries. Despite U.S. leadership in proposing these initiatives, providing assistance, and enforcing rules not every Southeast Asian country agreed to cooperate. Southeast Asian countries participation was informed by the calculation of costs and benefits of cooperation. High cooperation costs contributed to Southeast Asian countries refusal from taking part. As shown in the case of the RMSI high costs of cooperation resulted from the opposition of legal societal actors, the overtly militaristic approach of the initiative, and government anticipation of trouble from non-legal societal actors. This contributed to Indonesia and Malaysia rejecting the initiative. In the case of the CSI the requirement to purchase new equipment, use certain IT systems, accept the presence of U.S. in ports and go through periodic reviews limited Southeast Asian countries participation in the initiative. The case of the PSI shows that the possibility to curb the rights of a state as a major flag state and as a costal state and additional costs through compensating businesses due to shipments being delayed or damaged through interdiction activities could hamper participation. Given the mixed results brought by the U.S. led multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation Washington embarked on regional and bilateral cooperation to persuade more Southeast Asian countries to join the global war on terror.
The United States – ASEAN Cooperation
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks ASEAN first acknowledgment of the threat posed by terrorism to regional security was made in November 2001 as the regional organisation issued the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter-terrorism. The declaration committed the ASEAN member states to prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist act, to review and strengthen national mechanisms to combat terrorism, as well as to reinforce cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism. As a statement of intent and acknowledgement, the ASEAN counter-terrorism declaration signified the conduct of the ‘war on terror’ in the Southeast Asia; nonetheless, there was great division among the states on the role of the U.S. in counter-terrorism efforts, and a major disagreement on the way to combat terrorism.
The process to improve ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation was intensified since the 2002 Bali bombings. In November 2002 at the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh ASEAN leaders issues a Declaration on Terrorism, condemning the terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia and in Zamboanga and Quezon, the Philippines. A leapt forward in the regional counter-terrorism cooperation took place in November 2007, the same month when ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Charter, Southeast Asian leaders signed the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism in Cebu, the Philippines. This Convention is a legally binding document. It serves as a framework for regional cooperation to counter, prevent and suppress terrorism. The Convention requires participating states to: take measures to establish jurisdiction over criminal acts of terrorism in their land or a vessel flying their flag, guarantee fair treatment to any person who is taken into custody, carry out investigations, prosecute or extradite alleged offenders, notify the ASEAN Secretary General regarding incidents and detention of offenders, establish channels of communication between agencies, share best practices on rehabilitative programmes, provide mutual legal assistance to investigate terrorist attacks, designate a coordinating agency at national level and preserve confidential information, documents and other records.
Despite the significant progress in ASEAN regional counter-terrorism cooperation there are difficulties to implement counter-terrorism plans at regional level. These include the lack of specific discussion to deal with institutional capacity building or mechanism to coordinate the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime and the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime, the different capabilities of ASEAN member states and lack of financial resources or technical capacity. Consequently, ASEAN states rely on extra-regional partners such as the U.S. and Australia for information sharing and capacity building assistance. In order to fill the gap in the existing intra-regional counter-terrorism cooperation ASEAN has engaged extra-regional states primarily through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
The ARF is a dialogue and consultation forum on political and security issues that draws together the ASEAN member states and its dialogue partners including Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, India, Japan, the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Timor Leste, and the U.S. Extra regional states such as the U.S. and Australia have been active in sponsoring meetings, sharing information and providing technical support to ARF countries in counter-terrorism related matters such as post-blast and forensic investigation, quick response team, detection of fraudulent documents, and terrorist interdiction.
After the 9/11 attacks counter-terrorism cooperation between ASEAN and the U.S. was formalised through the signing of the ASEAN-U.S. Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International terrorism on August 1st, 2002. As part of the declaration ASEAN member states and the U.S. commit to improve intelligence and terrorist financing information sharing, enhance cooperation between their law enforcement agencies, strengthen capacity building efforts through training, consultation and joint operations, and provide assistance on transportation, border, and immigration control.
Since 2013 counter-terrorism cooperation between ASEAN and the U.S. is also discussed in the annual ASEAN-U.S. Summit. From the first ASEAN-U.S. Summit in October 2013 in Brunei Darussalam until the most recent sixth summit in Singapore in November 2018 terrorism has consistently featured as a common concern discussed in these meetings. At the 2017 Summit in Manila leaders of ASEAN and the U.S. pledged to redouble their cooperation efforts to fight terrorism and violent extremism, counter radicalisation and the flow of foreign terrorist fighters in and to the region. Areas of cooperation identified to address terrorism include enhancement of aviation and border security, sharing of information on terrorist networks and financing. At the 2018 Summit in Singapore the representatives of the U.S. and ASEAN members highlighted the ‘need to address root causes of terrorism and the flow of foreign terrorist fighters in and to the region and acknowledged the need for enhanced cooperation’.
In November 2015 ASEAN and the U.S. expanded their cooperation through the signing of two cooperation arrangements. These are the Joint Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership and the adoption of the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership. The ASEAN-U.S. strategic partnership is aimed to tackle challenging global is-sues such as terrorism, violent extremism, and climate change to mention a couple. The Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership (2016-2020) touches upon sup-port for ASEAN counter-terrorism programmes, including cooperation to combat terrorist fighters and sharing of best practices to counter violent extremism. In comparison to earlier cooperation arrangements signed by the U.S. and ASEAN the Plan of Action shows a more people oriented approach. The first part of the PoA suggested that the ‘overarching focus on …rule of law and good governance” will ensure that cooperation between ASEAN and the U.S. will help …secure dignity and human rights for our people’.
In February 2016 leaders of Southeast Asian countries and the U.S. gathered for the ASEAN-U.S. Special Leaders’ Summit in Sunnylands, U.S. The Sunnylands Summit marked the increasingly close cooperation between the two parties since it was the first Summit following the establishment of the ASEAN Community and was the first ever to be held in the U.S. The Summit reaffirmed the key principles that will guide the ASEAN-U.S. cooperation. These include commitment to ‘lead on global issues such as terrorism and violent extremism’ and strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and adherence to the rule of law, promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Overall since the 9/11 attacks we have witnessed an improved counter-terrorism cooperation between the U.S. and ASEAN. However, despite closer relations between the U.S. and ASEAN the counter-terrorism cooperation between the two parties continues to be strictly guided by the ASEAN Way principles that highlight the primacy of sovereignty and non-interference as stipulated in the1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Article 2 of the TAC obliges contracting parties to adhere to the ASEAN Way fundamental principles:
(a). mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; (b). the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;(c). non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; (d). settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; (e). renunciation of the threat or use of force…(Article 2 of the TAC, ASEAN 1976).
The 2002 ASEAN-U.S. Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International terrorism for instance, stipulates the importance to uphold the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-intervention in counter-terrorism cooperation. A Joint Vision Statement to launch an ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership issued on November 17th, 2005 by Southeast Asian states and the U.S. maintains that the TAC is the code of conduct governing ASEAN and the U.S. partnership. This is also the case for the PoA to Implement the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership (2016-2020) adopted by the two parties in 2015. The first sentence under the heading of PoA Political Security Cooperation reiterates the promotion of shared values and norms, including those enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).
In summary, ASEAN led counter-terrorism cooperation with the U.S. has been supported by Southeast Asian countries. This is because the ASEAN-U.S. counter-terrorism cooperation generates low costs and do not introduce significant changes to the existing counter-terrorism cooperation in Southeast Asia. Cooperation activities were carried out in a manner consistent with the principles of the ASEAN Way. Under this circumstance participating parties may refuse to act or exchange information if they deem such action could compromise national security or public order. The implementation costs of this agreement are low because Southeast Asian countries are not required to make significant policy adjustments to comply with the agreement and could receive benefits in the form of assistance and capacity building efforts.
Extensive Bilateral Cooperation
At bilateral level the U.S. cooperates extensively with Southeast Asian countries. The Philippines was the first Asian country to endorse the U.S. war on terror. The U.S. colonial role from 1898 to 1946 in the Philippines, and Washington’s counter-insurgency assistance to Manila since its independence in 1946, have helped to pave the way for the post 9/11 cooperation between the two countries. The Philippines government provided access to Clark and Subic military bases to be used as transit areas for international coalition troops that were going to fight in Afghanistan and offered to deploy its troops if requested by the international community. In 2002 the government of the Philippines signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) with the U.S. Article 3 paragraph 1 of the MLSA obligates the two countries to participate in cooperative efforts both within and outside of Philippines territory. As part of the concrete implementation of this agreement in the U.S. war against Iraq the government provided the coalition forces with access to the Philippines’ airspace for humanitarian assistance to go through.
The first U.S. policy program in Southeast Asia was also expressed through assistance to the Philippines. Their government received USD 100 million in training assistance, military equipment, and maintenance support for the Philippine armed forces. In 2002, 660 U.S. Special Forces were dispatched in the southern Philippines to combat the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The southern part of the country gained significance in the U.S. war on terror as the region had become a sanctuary and training ground for Islamic terrorists and militant groups in Southeast Asia. The Philippines and the U.S. government labelled the military operation in Luzon as a Balikatan training exercise, in order to circumvent constitution of the Philippines which forbids the presence of foreign forces on its territory, despite the fact that the U.S. forces were armed and authorised to return fire if attacked.
In comparison to the Philippines, Singapore has provided quieter but very decisive backing towards the United States’ global war against terrorism. Singapore plays a leading role in advancing international counter-terrorism cooperation. The city-state provided firm support for the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Singapore allowed the U.S. armed forces on the way to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to transit through the city-state, trained Iraqi police, and deployed a tank landing ship with 170 personnel, a C-130 detachment, and three separate KC-135 detachments for air-to-air refuelling missions.
Singapore has shown the most vigorous responses at international level in addressing the threat posed by the IS. The city-state co-sponsored the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters in 2014. This resolution aimed to cut off financial and material support for the IS and prevents the movement of foreign terrorist fighters. In December 2014, before the parliament, Singapore’s Minister of Defence Ng Eng Hen announced that the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) will deploy KC-135R tanker aircraft for air-to-air refuelling, an Imagery Analysis Team, and 50-60 soldiers to join the multinational coalition efforts to combat ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
In contrast to Singapore and the Philippines enthusiastic involvement in the war against terrorism, Malaysia’s reaction was mixed. Kuala Lumpur, while resolute in dealing with extremism and terrorism, has toned down its sympathy with warnings against making Islam the target of the U.S. war on terror. The 9/11 attacks provided new momentum for the Malaysian government to intensify its war against extremists and investigate the degree of local involvement in Al Qaeda operations. In 2003 Malaysia captured key militants including two members of Hambali network, a major leader of JI.
In term of cooperation with the U.S. in 2003 Malaysia launched the Southeast Asian Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre that received financial support from the U.S. As the U.S. dispatched its Special Forces to Mindanao, Malaysia has taken significant interest to play a leading role in negotiating a peaceful conflict resolution between Manila and the MILF, the largest Muslim separatist group with links to JI and Al Qaeda. The unresolved conflict between Muslim separatist movements in the southern part of Mindanao with the central government in Manila has led to significant increase of terrorist activities in the region. New peace arrangements are deemed crucial to hold back terrorist activities in the region. After the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro on October 15th, 2012 Malaysia continues to be the third party facilitator in the establishment of a new Muslim autonomous region in Mindanao.
Indonesia has sought to distance its counter-terrorism efforts from the U.S. war on terror. At bilateral level, however, Indonesia has cooperated closely with the U.S. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 attacks the Indonesian President Megawati offered her support that included granting over-flight rights for the U.S. military support aircraft. She rapidly changed her sympathetic remarks to the U.S. following strong opposition at domestic level. The strongest opposition came from her vice president, Hamzah Haz, who led the largest Islamic party in Indonesia the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), who claimed that ‘the terrorist attack may help the U.S. atone for its sin’. Despite this anti-U.S. political rhetoric, the Indonesian government has made a positive contribution to the U.S. effort. A leap forward for the Indonesian government was the arrest of senior al-Qaida operative Omar al-Faruq in June 2002. Within three days of the arrest, Indonesian authorities handed over al-Faruq to the U.S.
In order to improve bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation Indonesia and the U.S. signed the Defence Framework Arrangement in June 2010. The defence arrangement requires Indonesia and the U.S. to work together to maintain regular dialogue particularly through the Indonesia-US Security Dialog and the United States-Indonesia Bilateral Defence Discussion; sustain and develop the existing education and training programmes; provide capacity building in security sector; and ensure cooperation in the area of operational support and military supplies including acquisition, sale and exchange of goods and services. As part of the bilateral cooperation Indonesia gained access to more than 100 joint programmes under the U.S. Pacific Command’s Theatre Security Cooperation ranging from education, training, and exercises, to major foreign military sales and financing.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks Southeast Asian countries have cooperated extensively with the U.S. at bilateral level. This close cooperation has been displayed both by long standing U.S. allies in the region such as Singapore and the Philippines, and countries that had been disassociating their counter-terrorism efforts from Washington’s war on terror such as Malaysia and Indonesia. At the bilateral level Southeast Asian countries could gain significant benefits from cooperation in terms of military assistance and participation in U.S. security training without making substantial changes at the domestic level.
Analysis of U.S. counter-terrorism cooperation with Southeast Asian countries shows the relative success of cooperation at bilateral and regional levels. In contrast, Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia were ambivalent towards U.S. led multilateral initiatives and, in some cases, rejected U.S. efforts. Across the cases of cooperation and non-cooperation examined in this chapter it can be concluded that Southeast Asian countries’ participation in cooperation arrangements with the U.S. was informed by the calculation of absolute gains.
For Southeast Asian countries the benefits of bilateral and regional counter-terrorism cooperation outweighed the costs. From the bilateral and regional counter-terrorism cooperation with the U.S. countries in Southeast Asia gained benefits in terms of information sharing, gifting of equipment, and capacity building to improve forensic investigation, quick response teams, detection of fraudulent documents, cargo inspection at port, and terrorist interdiction. The existing U.S. – Southeast Asia bilateral and regional cooperation in counter-terrorism was not costly to implement. Bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation arrangements with the U.S. were voluntary in nature and reserved the rights of participating countries to exercise jurisdiction in its own territory. In a similar vein, the ASEAN led counter-terrorism cooperation arrangements with the U.S. did not demand Southeast Asian states to introduce substantial changes at domestic level and maintained the sacrosanct of the ASEAN Way principles that highlight the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The substantial benefits of cooperation and low costs associated with the bilateral and regional U.S. – Southeast Asia counter-terrorism cooperation contrasts with the U.S. led multilateral initiatives such as the CSI, the PSI, and the RMSI. The CSI was costly as it required participating parties to purchase new equipment, accept the presence of U.S. CBP teams in its port, and to go through periodic reviews. The PSI could bring additional economic costs through compensating businesses due to shipments being delayed or damaged through interdiction activities. The RMSI had high costs due to the opposition of societal actors and government anticipation of trouble from militant groups. For some Southeast Asian countries, the benefits of cooperation in these U.S. led multilateral initiatives were further reduced because counter-terrorism cooperation had intensified since the 2002 Bali bombings and had already begun to show positive results. The benefits were further reduced because Southeast Asian countries could gain the benefits of cooperation in the form of information, training, and equipment through bilateral and regional channels. Therefore, without participating in the U.S. led multilateral initiatives countries in Southeast Asia can still benefit from cooperating with the U.S. via bilateral and regional channels. This shows that Southeast Asian countries chose to cooperate with the U.S. when the benefits outweighed the costs. This is important to those involved in the design, negotiation, and formulation of decision on counter-terrorism cooperation arrangements that involve countries in the region. It is vital that policy makers understand that in order to achieve success the absolute gains should be enough to entice Southeast Asian countries to cooperate.
Acharya, Arabinda (2007) “Maritime Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia,” in Maritime Security
in Southeast Asia. Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan (eds.). New York: Routledge.
ASEAN (1976) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 24 February 1976.
Available from http://asean.org/treaty-amity-cooperation-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976/. Accessed 21 May 2016.
ASEAN (2001) ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter-terrorism, 5 November 2001.
Available from http://www.aseansec.org/5620.htm. Accessed 24 March 2008.
ASEAN (2004) “ASEAN-U.S. Security: U.S. Proposes Cooperation on Maritime Security for
Asia-Pacific,” 5 December 2004. Available from http://www.aseansec.org/afp/42.htm. Accessed 5 October 2009.
ASEAN (2012) The Joint Vision Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership, 16
May 2012. Available from http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-vision-statement-on-the-asean-us-enhanced-partnership. Accessed 19 April 2018.
ASEAN (2013) Chairman’s Statement of the 1st ASEAN-United States Summit 9 October
2013. Available from http://asean.org/storage/images/archive/23rdASEANSummit/Chairman’s%20Statement%20of%20the%201st%20ASEAN-U.S.%20Summit%20-%20FINAL.pdf. Accessed 25 April 2018.
ASEAN (2014) 2nd ASEAN-United States Summit 13 November 2014. Available from
http://asean.org/storage/2012/05/25th-Chairmans-Statement-2nd-ASEAN-US-Summit.pdf. Accessed 25 April 2018.
ASEAN (2015a) Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership (2016-
2020). Available from http://asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/27th-summit/statement/ASEAN-US%20POA%202016-2020_Adopted.pdf. Accessed 19 April 2018.
ASEAN (2015b) Chairman’s Statement of the 3rd ASEAN-United States Summit, Kuala
Lumpur, 21 November 2015. Available from http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Final-Chairmans-Statement-of-3rd-ASEAN-US-Summit.pdf. Accessed 22 April 2018.
ASEAN (2016a) Chairman’s Statement of the 4th ASEAN-United States Summit 8 September
2016, Vientiane, Lao PDR. Available from http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/Chairmans-Statement-of-the-4th-ASEAN-US-Summit1.pdf. Accessed 24 April 2018.
ASEAN (2016b) Joint Statement of the ASEAN-U.S. Special Leaders’ Summit: Sunnylands
Declaration. Available from http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Sunnylands-Declaration-FINAL-16-Feb-2016.pdf. Accessed 22 April 2018.
ASEAN (2017) Chairman’s Statement of the 5th ASEAN-United States Summit 13 November
2017, Manila, Philippines. Available from http://asean.org/storage/2017/12/5th-ASEAN-US-Summit-Chairs-Statement-FINAL.pdf. Accessed 22 April 2018.
ASEAN (2018) Chairman’s Statement of the 6th ASEAN-United States Summit 15 November
2018, Singapore. Available from https://asean.org/storage/2018/11/ASEAN-US-Summit-Chairman_Statement-Final.pdf. Accessed 10 August 2019.
Bakar, Osman (2005) “The Impact of the American War on Terror on Malaysian Islam.” Islam
and Christian-Muslim Relations 16:2, pp.107-127.
Bakorkamla (2010) Buku Putih Bakorkamla 2009. Jakarta: Pustaka Cakra.
Bakti, Ikrar Nusa (2010) “Bilateral Relations between Indonesia and the Philippines: Stable
and Cooperative,” in International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism, N. Ganesan and Ramses Amer (Eds.). Singapore: ISEAS.
Banloi, Rommel C (2002) “The Role of Philippine – American Relations in the Global
Campaign Against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24:2, pp. 294-312.
Barnes, Paul and Oloruntoba, Richard (2005) “Assurance of security in maritime supply
chains: Conceptual issues of vulnerability and crisis management,” Journal of International Management 11, pp. 519-540.
Barrett, Richard (2014) The Soufan Group Report: Foreign Fighters in Syria. Available from
http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf. Accessed 27 January 2015.
Barton, Greg (2008) “Indonesia’s Year of Living Normally: Taking the Long View on
Indonesia’s Progress.” Southeast Asian Affairs, pp. 123-145.
Bateman, Sam (2005) “Maritime Regime Building,” in The Best of Times, The Worst of
Times: Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific. Joshua Ho & Catherine Zara Raymond (eds.). Singapore: World Scientific & Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.
BBC, “SE Asia acts on maritime security,” 29 June 2004. Available from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3849217.stm. Accessed 11 May 2013.
Boutilier, James (2005) “The Best of Times, the Worst of Times: The Global Maritime Outlook
2004,” in The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific. Joshua Ho & Catherine Zara Raymond (eds). 2005: Singapore.
Buzan, Barry (2006) “Will the Global War on Terrorism be the New Cold War?,” International
Affairs, 82:6, pp. 1101-1118.
Capie, David (2004) “Between A Hegemon and A Hard Place: the ‘War on Terror’ and Southeast Asian-US Relations.” The Pacific Review 17:2, pp. 223-248.
Case, William (2003) “Singapore in 2002: Economic Lassitude and Threats to Security.” Asian Survey 43:1, pp. 167-173.
Channel News Asia, “SAF to send 50-60 personnel to combat ISIS threat: Ng Eng Hen,” 1
December 2014. Available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/saf-to-send-50-60/1504122.html. Accessed 7 January 2015.
Chau, Andrew (2008) Security Community and Southeast Asia: Australia, the U.S., and
ASEAN’s Counter-Terror Strategy. Asian Survey 48: 4, pp.626-649.
Choong, William, “US: It’s not for us to police Malacca Straits – American forces will not step
in to pre-empt threats, say top officials,” The Sunday Times, 6 June 2004.
Chow, Jonathan T (2005) “ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation Since 9/11”. Asian Survey,
Embassy of the United States in Nassau, “CSI Scanner Unveiling Ceremony: Remarks by U.S.
Ambassador John D. Rood at the Freeport Container Port, Freeport, Grand Bahama, 11 January 2007.” Available from http://nassau.usembassy.gov/sp_12012007.html. Accessed 8 May 2010.
Febrica, Senia (2017a) “Refining the Importance of Audience in Securitization: Southeast
Asia’s Fight against Terrorism,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy. S.N. Romaniuk, S.Webb, D. Irrera & F. Grice (eds.) London: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.703-731.
Febrica, Senia (2017b) Maritime Security and Indonesia: Cooperation, Interests and
Strategies. London: Routledge.
Febrica, Senia and Sudarman, Suzie (2018)“Analysing Indonesian Media and Government
Representation of China.” Journal of British Association for Chinese Studies 8:2, pp.89-119.
Febrica, Senia (2019) “Counter-terrorism and Human Rights in ASEAN Since 9/11” in
International Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism. S. Hoadley (ed.). New York: Springer, pp.1-29.
Gerstl, Alfred (2010) The Depoliticisation and ‘ASEANisation’ of Counter-Terrorism Policies
in South-East Asia: A Weak Trigger for a Fragmented Version of Human Security. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 3:1, pp.48-74.
Hedman, Eva-Lotta E (2006) “The Philippines in 2005: Old Dynamics, New Conjuncture.”
Asian Survey 46:1, pp.187-193.
Ho, Joshua (2007) “Securing the Seas as a Medium of Transportation in Southeast Asia,” in
The Security of Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean Region. Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia.
Indonesian Ministry of Defence, “DPR Menentang Pengerahan Armada AS ke Selat Malaka,”
26 April 2004. Available from http://www.kemhan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=5567DPR. Ac-cessed 10 October 2009.
Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004) Forum Dialog ke XI Kerjasama Maritim
ASEAN. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan.
Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006) Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli Membahas Aspek
Strategis Diplomasi Kelautan Dalam Mendukung Pembangunan Nasional. Jakarta: Indonesian MFA.
International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau (ICC IMB) “Maritime
piracy and armed robbery reaches 22-year low, says IMB report,” 10 January 2018. Available from https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/maritime-piracy-armed-robbery-reaches-22-year-low-says-imb-report/. Last accessed 8 August 2019.
Jakarta Post, “Customs service wants to negotiate over new U.S. import policy,” 15 March
2003; accessed from the Newsbank database.
Jakarta Post, “No plan to deploy troops to Malacca Strait: U.S.,” 20 April 2004; accessed from
the Newsbank database.
Jakarta Post, “Osama’s death will not stop local radicals: Experts,” 3 May 2011; accessed from
the Newsbank database.
Jakarta Post, “Alarming Rise in IS Support,” 8 December 2014. Available from
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/12/08/alarming-rise-is-support.html, 26 January 2015.
Jones, David Martin, Michael L.R. Smith, and Mark Weeding (2003) “Looking for the Pattern:
Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia- The Genealogy of a Terror Network”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26:6, pp. 443-457.
Jones, Sidney (2011) “The Ongoing Extremist Threat in Indonesia.” Southeast Asian Affairs,
Koga, Kei (2011) “The US and East Asian Regional Security Architecture: Building a Regional
Security Nexus on Hub-and-Spoke.” Asian Perspective 35:1, pp. 1-36.
Kepabeanan Internasional (2008) “Seratus Persen Scanning Atas Ekspor Barang ke Amerika
Serikat,” in Warta Bea Cukai 402. Available from http://www.scribd.com/doc/7707773/Warta-Bea-Cukai-Edisi-402. Accessed 15 March 2012.
Kurlantzick, Joshua (2002) “Tilting at Dominios: America and Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia”,
Current History 101: 659, pp.421-426
Laksmana, Evan A., “Indonesia ‘s pivotal role in the US’s grand strategy”, Jakarta Post, 6
October 2009; accessed from the Newsbank database.
Liow, Joseph Chin Yong, “ISIS Goes to Asia,” 21 September 2014. Available from
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/09/21-isis-goes-to-asia-liow. Accessed 27 January 2015.
Martinez, Patricia (2002) “Malaysia in 2001: An Interlude of Consolidation.” Asian Survey
Medeiros, John. “No plans to unilaterally deploy US forces to secure Malacca Straits,” Straits
Times, 7 April 2004.
Morada, Noel M (2003) “Philippine-American Security Relations After 11 September:
Exploring the Mutuality of Interests in the Fight against International Terrorism.” Southeast Asian Affairs, pp. 228-238.
National Institute for Defence Studies (2003) “Southeast Asia-Elections and New
Governments.” East Asia Strategic Review. Tokyo: National Institute for Defence Studies.
Nikitin, Mary Beth (2010) Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress:
Proliferation Security Initiative. Available from http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34327_20100108.pdf. Last accessed 15 February 2012.
Nuswantoro, Laksamana Pertama Edhi (2005) “Pengelolaan Keamanan Selat Malaka Secara
Terpadu,” in Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli Tentang Kebijakan Terpadu Pengelolaan Keamanan Selat Malaka, Medan 19-20 Juli 2005. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan Departemen Luar Negeri.
Peleo, Amador (2008) “Importing Misery: Interstate Relations, National Governance and Local
Insurgency.” In-Spire 2:2, pp.15-26. Available from https://inspirejournal.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/peleo22.pdf. Accessed 24 June 2015.
Philippine Official Gazette, “Speech of the Prime Minister Najib of Malaysia during the
signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, October 15, 2012.” Available from http://www.gov.ph/2012/10/15/speech-of-the-prime-minister-najib-of-malaysia-during-the-signing-of-the-framework-agreement-on-the-bangsamoro-october-15-2012/, 5 May 2015.
Philippine Star, “Malaysia to remain as broker in peace talks,” 4 April 2013. Available from
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/04/04/926726/malaysia-remain-broker-peace-talks, 5 May 2015.
Pushpanathan, S (2003) ASEAN Efforts to Combat Terrorism. Available from
http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-efforts-to-combat-terrorism-by-spushpanathan. Accessed 18 April 2018.
Ramakrishna, Kumar (2005) ““The Southeast Asian Approach” to Counter-Terrorism:
Learning from Indonesia and Malaysia.” The Journal of Conflict Studies 25:1, pp. 27-47.
Raymond, Catherine Zara (2006) “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment.”
Terrorism and Political Violence 18:2, pp.239-257.
Rose, G.I. and Nestorovska, D (2005) Towards an ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Treaty.
Singapore Yearbook of International Law 9: 157-189.
Rosenberg, David and Chung, Christopher (2008) “Maritime Security in the South China Sea:
Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities.” Ocean Development and International Law 39:1, pp. 51-68.
Ryan, Maria (2011) “War in countries we are not at war with’: The ‘war on terror’ on the
periphery from Bush to Obama.” International Politics 48:2, pp.364–389.
Sebastian, Leonard C (2003) “Indonesian State Responses to September 11, the Bali Bombings
and the War in Iraq: Sowing the Seeds for an Accomodationist Islamic Framework?”. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 16:3, pp. 429-446.
Sindonews, “PW: Menkominfo Jokowi Harus Mampu Tekan Terorisme,” 25 October 2014.
Available from http://nasional.sindonews.com/read/915054/12/ipw-menkominfo-jokowi-harus-mampu-tekan-terorisme-1414162424. Accessed 22 January 2015.
Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs (2008) “Countering Threat: Terrorism.” Available from
http://www.mha.gov.sg/isd/ct.htm#terrorism. Accessed 24 March 2008.
Simon, Sheldon W (2001) “US-Southeast Asia Relations: Mixed Reactions in Southeast Asia
to the US War on Terror.” CSIS Hawaii. Available from http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0104qus_seasia.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2015.
Solahudin, “Jokowi’s Priorities in Addressing Terrorism,” Jakarta Post, 18 September 2014.
Available from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/18/jokowi-s-priorities-addressing-terrorism.html, 21 January 2015.
Smith, Anthony L (2005) “The Politics of Negotiating the Terrorist Problem in Indonesia,”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28:1, pp. 33—44.
Song, Yann-huei. (2007). “Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime
Security Initiative: Responses to the US Proposal,” in International Law Studies Vol. 83: Global Legal Challenges: Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications, and Natural Disasters, Michael D. Carsten (Ed.). Newport: Naval War College Press. Available at https://www.usnwc.edu/Research—Gaming/International-Law/New-International-Law-Studies-%28Blue-Book%29-Series/International-Law-Blue-Book-Articles.aspx?Volume=83. Last accessed 20 May 2014.
Sumaryono, Laksmana Muda TNI Djoko. (2004). “Kerjasama Regional Maritim ASEAN dari
Perspektif Keamanan Matra Laut,” in Forum Dialog ke XI Kerjasama Maritim ASEAN. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan Departe-men Luar Negeri.
Straits Times, “Terrorist threat to Singapore remains: DPM Teo,” 8 March 2013. Available
from http://www.straitstimes.com/microsites/parliament/story/terrorist-threat-singapore-remains-dpm-teo-20130308. Accessed 18 December 2014.
United Nations, “Permanent Mission of Singapore for the United Nations: Small States – The
Challenges of Sustainable Development.” Available from http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/SG_en.pdf, 7 January 2015.
United States Coast Guard. (2002). “Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security.” Available
from http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/uscgmaritimestrategy2002.pdf. Last accessed 20 October 2009.
United States Customs and Border Protection (U.S. CBP). (2006). Container Security Initiative
2006-2011 Strategic Plan.US. Washington D.C.: Customs and Border Protection Office of Policy and Planning and Office of International Affairs Container Security Di-vision, available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/…security/…/csi_strategic_plan.pdf. Last accessed 7 May 2010.
U.S. CBP, “CSI In Brief,” available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/csi_in_brief.xml. Last accessed 8 May 2010.
United States Department of Defense, “Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies,” 5 June 2004. Available from http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3335. Last accessed 24 March 2008.
United States Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction
Principles,” 4 September 2003, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm. Last accessed 15 February 2012.
U.S. Department of State Archieve, “Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked
Questions, 26 May 2008.” Available from http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/105217.htm. Last accessed 17 February 2012.
U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” Available from
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm. Last accessed 16 July 2013.
United States House of Representatives, “H.A.S.C. No. 108–21: Hearings on National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005-H.R. 4200 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives,” 31 March 2004 available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has091000.000/has091000_0.HTM. Last accessed 5 February 2011.
United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). (2004a) “The Regional Maritime Security
Initiative.” Available from http://www.pacom.mil/rmsi/. Last accessed 5 October 2009.
USPACOM. (2004b). “United States Pacific Command Strategy for Maritime Security.”
Available from http://www.pacom.mil/rmsi/RMSI%20Strategy%20Nov%2004.pdf. Last accessed 5 October 2009.
USPACOM. (2004c). ““Blue Top” Document on the Regional Maritime Security Initiative.”
Available from http://www.pacom.mil/rmsi/. Last accessed 21 October 2009.
Valencia, Mark J. (2006a). “Security Issues in the Malacca Straits: Whose Security and Why
It Matters?” in Building a Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca: Proceeding of the MIMA International Conference on the Straits of Malac-ca, 11-13 October, 2004. Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia.
Wisnumurti, Nugroho. (2009). “Maritime Security Issues in Southeast Asia: An Indonesian
Perspective.” Indonesian Journal of International Law 6:3, pp. 333-352.
 Oxford Project Southeast Asia 2015 as cited in Febrica and Sudarman 2018: 90
 Coutrier 1988: 186-188; Invest ASEAN 2015 as cited in Febrica and Sudarman 2018: 90
 Jones, Smith, and Weeding 2003: 444
 Chow 2005: 304
 Buzan 2006: 1103
 Capie 2004: 223
 Febrica 2017b: 104
 This section is heavily drawn from Febrica 2017a: 703-731
 Jakarta Post 3 May 2011
 Smith 2005: 36
 Barton 2008: 132
 National Institute for Defense Studies 2004: 126
 Solahudin 18 September 2014
 Jones 2011: 97
 Jones 2011: 97; Barton 2008:136
 Martinez 2002: 135
 Bakar 2005: 124
 Martinez 2002:135
 Ramakrishna 2005: 31
 Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs 2008
 Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs 2008
 Case 2003: 172
 Straits Times, 8 March 2013
 Chew 2005: 75
 ICC IMB 10 January 2018
 ICC IMB 10 January 2018
 Bakti 2010: 299-300
 Barett 2014: 9; UN 7 January 2015
 Jakarta Post 8 December 2014; Barrett 2014: 13; Liow 21 September 2014
 Sindonews 25 October 2014
 Koga 2011:1
 Koga 2011:1
 U.S. Coast Guard 2002:i. This section is heavily drawn from Febrica 2017b: 108-113.
 Raymond 2006:239
 Valencia 2006:97
 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 8 May 2010; 2006: 19, 21-23; Rosenberg and Chung 2008:53; Barnes and Oloruntoba 2005:523
 Embassy of the United States in Nassau 11 January 2007
 U.S. CBP 2006:8; Rosenberg and Chung 2008:54
 Jakarta Post 15 March 2003
 U.S. Department of States (DoS) 4 September 2003; Nikitin 2010:2
 U.S. DoS 4 September 2003; Nikitin 2010:2
 U.S. DoS 26 May 2008
 U.S. DoS 26 May 2008; Nikitin 2010:2
 U.S. DoS 16 July 2013
 Indonesian MFA 2004: 9
 Nuswantoro 2005:21; Indonesian MFA 2004: 9
 Interview with an Indonesian government official (Jakarta, 4 November 2011)
 ASEAN 5 December 2004; USPACOM 2004a; Bateman 2005: 260
 Ho 2007: 216
 USPACOM 2004a; US-PACOM 2004b:6
 USPACOM 2004c; Boutilier 2005: 27
 Kucera 2006:13 as cited in Song 2007: 110
 U.S. House of Representatives 31 March 2004
 Medeiros 7 April 2004; Jakarta Post 20 April 2004; Choong 6 June 2004
 Jakarta Post 20 April 2004
 Choong 6 June 2004
 Interview with a former high government official at the Ministry of Defence (Depok, 8 October 2011)
 Indonesian Ministry of Defence (MoD) 26 April 2004
 Indonesian MoD 26 April 2004
 Wisnumurti 2009:347; Acharya 2007: 87; Bakorkamla 2010:100; BBC 29 June 2004
 This section is heavily drawn from Febrica 2019: 1-29
 ASEAN, 5 November 2001
 Chow 2005: 306
 Pushpanathan 2003
 see Rose and Nestorovska 2005:186; Chau 2008: 633; Gerstl 2010: 65-66
 Chau 2008: 633
 see Pushpanathan 2003; ASEAN 2015a: 3
 ASEAN 2013: 7; ASEAN 2014: 2-3; ASEAN 2015b: 2; ASEAN 2016a: 2; ASEAN 2017: 4; ASEAN 2018:1
 ASEAN 2017: 2-4
 ASEAN 2018: 1
 ASEAN 2015a:1
 ASEAN 2016b: 1
 ASEAN 2016b: 1-2
 ASEAN 2012
 ASEAN 2015a: 14
 This section is heavily drawn from Febrica 2017a and Febrica 2017b
 Ryan 2011: 377
 Banloi 2002: 297-298; Peleo 2008: 15,16
 Banloi 2002: 302
 Morada 2003: 235
 Morada 2003: 236
 Desker 2002: 169
 Kurlantzick 2002: 423
 Hedman 2006: 191
 Chow 2005: 311
 Simon 2001: 1
 Smith 2005: 4
 UN 7 January 2015
 Channel News Asia 1 December 2014
 Martinez 2002: 139; Simon 2001: 1
 Bakar 2005: 110
 Ramakrishna 2005: 31
 Ramakrishna 2005: 37
 Bakar 2015:113
 Bakar 2015: 113
 Philippines Official Gazette 15 October 2012; Philippine Star 4 April 2013
 Capie 2004: 227
 Sebastian 2003: 432
 Smith 2005 as cited in Febrica 2010: 583
 see Febrica 2010: 583
 see Febrica 2017b: 105
 Laksmana 6 October 2009