Abstract: This research project assesses the role that Australia is playing in Southeast Asia in countering the threat of Salafi-jihadi terrorism. The study, drawing on publicly available information, strives to highlight the challenge that Australia faces because inter-state cooperation is limited due to historical tensions. The study focuses on the countering terrorism financing, the role of the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation and how Australia is seeking to shaping a regional response to terrorism through ASEAN.
Australia has always had an interest in Southeast Asia.
From a counterterrorism perspective, the most devastating terrorist attack against Australians occurred in Bali in 2002. The bombing has come to define Australia’s engagement with the region, and specifically with Indonesia, which is why any Salafi-jihadi attack, potential attacks, or any form of Islamist rhetoric, raises concerns in Canberra.
Successive Australian governments have taken a bifurcated approach to counterterrorism drawing at times on hard power, which includes military support for counterterrorism as was the case with Marawi, and on soft power, which ranges from supporting specific legislative reforms to deal with radicalisation, terrorist recruitment, the financing of terrorism. Australia has also provided support for civil society organisations, prison reform, socio-economic development. Consequently, in looking at Australia’s engagement with Southeast Asian countries in the realm of counterterrorism it is useful to see it operating through bilateral engagement with specific member states getting more attention and support coupled with an Australian commitment to work within the ASEAN security framework, which often refers to working to develop and adopt regional norms.
Two key issues currently occupy Australia and the Southeast Asian states when it comes to countering terrorism. First, both are grappling with the prospect of returning foreign fighters. Australia had seen around 200 of its nationals make the journey to Iraq and Syria, whereas in terms of Southeast Asia, one suspects that around a thousand or so have made the journey. There are marked differences with how the Southeast Asian countries have dealt with those that have travelled to Iraq and Syria and Australia’s approach. Second, both are facing the challenge of online violent extremism. Publicly available information suggests that there is not much cooperation or at least evidence of a united position on the first, as Canberra has adopted a zero-tolerance policy that involves temporary exclusion orders and the revocation of Australian citizenship to dual-nationals, whereas Malaysia and Indonesia have chosen to take in these individuals many of whom are women and children. On the issue of online radicalisation, there has been more cooperation and support, as seen with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on cyber cooperation between Australia and Indonesia or the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice, aimed at enhancing information sharing between the two countries, including between the Australian Federal Police and the Indonesian National Police.
In sum, and as will be shown in this chapter, there has been effective progress in the developing an Australian-Southeast Asia counterterrorism agenda, as there is general agreement that terrorism poses a major threat to the region and that only through cooperation can the threat be minimised. And yet, what has often undermined cooperation were tensions, based in part, on the complicated relationship that Australia has had with its neighbours, but also because the ASEAN countries must move slowly when dealing with regional security issues. This may explain why Australia has, at times, chosen to either develop bilateral relations with specific countries mainly Indonesia, or work through ASEAN.
The threat environment
Salafi-jihadi groups use globalisation, specifically innovations in communication, social media, finance, etc. to continue their campaign and seek out new disciples.
There are disputes amongst analysts as to the scope of ISIL’s presence and appeal in Southeast Asia. Peter Chalk for example has argued that Islamism has a greater presence in Malaysia, whereas other commentators emphasise Indonesia and the Philippines as areas in which Salafi-jihadism is likely to make substantial advancement, which include concern over al-Qaeda’s presence in the region. Andrew Zammit has noted between 2014 and 2018, most of those that committed terrorist activities in Australia were inspired by ISIL as opposed to having direct connection to them. The difference was the 2017, Sydney Airport plot where connection to the IS was notable.
It is evident that both al-Qaeda and ISIL are engaged in a rebuilding programme aimed at cementing existing ties and establishing links with new groups in the region. This is because they both see Southeast Asia is of great interest to their movements as the region has benefitted from the technologically revolution (the youth are very connected – in 2015, over 64 million Indonesians had a Facebook account and around 20 million had a Twitter account; in Cambodia, virtually every person under the age of 30 has a Facebook account). Such transition often create and amplifies one’s sense of alienation, as individuals feel for example that the society that they know and love is radically changing, which seems to have been the subtext in Prabowo Subianto election campaign and may explain why President Joko Widodo chose Ma’ruf Amin to run as his vice-president. Alternatively, there are those that argue that the promises that come with globalisation do not benefit them, but rather bring corrupting influences.
In 2016, three southeast Asian men appeared in an Islamic State video beheading a captive. A video from September 2017, released by Al Hayat featured a Singaporean man calling on people to ‘Join the ranks of the Mujahidin in East Asia, and inflict black days upon the crusaders. Otherwise, make your way to Sham [Syria], Khurasan, Yemen, West Africa, and Libya.’ In January 2018, Filipino authorities claimed to have arrested a Spanish man, Abdelhakim Labidi Adib, in Maluso, near Basilan, whom they assert wasn’t only a support of the Abu Sayyaf Group but who was carrying grenades and bomb parts. In October 2018, the Armed Forces of the Philippines declared that it identified 32 foreign fighters who had fought in Marawi, suggesting that the conflict had an international-bent. In November 2018, the Malay the Bukit Aman Special Branch Counter Terrorism Division announced that it had arrested seven Filipino nationals and a Malay national in Putrajaya and Sabah alleging that these individuals were part of the Abu Sayyaf Group. The individuals were accused of engaging in kidnapping-for-ransom operations in southern Philippines and Sabah.
It is evident that in 2019, transnational and local Salafi-jihadis have altered their strategy in terms of operation and recruitment. ISIL especially after the Battle for Marawi has been seeking greater lone-actor activity while al-Qaeda is likely to continue with campaign of having a ‘softer’ image (less mass casualty attacks) and embedding itself with local groups and activists. Notably, because Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have had to contend with Islamists for many years and because of their experience with such groups as Jemaah Islamiyah, they have developed a robust system of keeping close checks of radical preachers and even though there is always a possibility of something going wrong, there is a general sense that national security forces are cognizant of the threat and the need to share information so as to prevent attacks, as seen by the arrests of a cell called Lion of Allah, in Kebumen, Bandung and Bekasi. The seven members of the cell allegedly met online and were radicalised through online sources. In July 2018, Indonesian security services arrested ten members of a pro-ISIL group called Ansharul Kholaqoh. There have been others arrests, and it is notable that often the cells focused on attacking police or security services, as opposed to soft targets.
A growing appreciation of ISIL’s shrewd use of social media, has encouraged scholars to explore the influence of al-Qaedaism in the region. Sidney Jones the head of the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) has noted ‘Defeats of ISIS in the Middle East have not weakened the determination of ISIS supporters to wage war at home since they can no longer get to Syria … JAD cells are likely to act on their own, if and when they have the opportunity or the resources to do so.’ In this vein, it is important to note that impact that the Battle for Marawi had on the region, in which Australia played an key role by providing information to the Filipino military in real time by using two P3 Orion reconnaissance. Australia supported the military operation because as Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull stated to do nothing would create a ‘Raqqa on Australia’s doorsteps’ which meant putting security concerns over the fact that it was supporting Rodrigo Duterte. From an Australian and a regional perspective, close attention is being placed on the Southern Philippines and the polices of the Duterte government because the region will not countenance another Marawi and certainly a Marawi that last as long as the last battle lasted (which was 157 days). This may explain why both on a regional level, but also bilaterally, much effort has gone to address the potential pull and push factors that created the conditions for Marawi. The Australian government has allocated $12 million for 2017-2020 to support the BASIC Bangsamoro program, through the Australian Partnerships for Peace, which is a long commitment by Australia to help bring stability and development to Mindanao. Australia has also allocated $2.3 million to a specific program entitled Support to Task Force Bangon Marawi, which is administered by the World Bank. The purpose is to rebuild Marawi City, which was largely destroyed by the fighting. In 2017, the government also allocated $90 million for another specialist program Education Pathways to Peace in Conflict-Affected Areas of Mindanao, which should run until 2026. The program is meant to provide educational opportunities to children in the Autonomous Regional of Muslim Mindanao.
The threat vis-à-vis Australia is more difficult to assess due to the fact that most of the terrorist attacks or attempts at attacks were carried out by home-grown, lone actor component associated with Salafi-jihadism and the fact that to date neither ISIL nor al-Qaeda have successfully carried out a mass casualty attack in the country. Nevertheless, the threat from Salafi-jihadis vis-à-vis Australia and Australian interests remains substantial which is why the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation has kept the threat level on Probable since 2014, and it is not likely to change its assessment in the near future.
Australia and Southeast Asia, balancing bilateral and regional engagement
Historical tensions have defined the relationship between Australia and Southeast, which is why the relationship has been fraught with challenges as seen for example in 2017, when Indonesia suspended its military cooperation with Australia claiming that its troops found offensive materials about Pancasila in an Australian base used by Indonesian troops for training.
Australia looks to the region as a potential source of instability and insecurity caused in part by a weak political (democratic) system (most of the countries of the region are not democratic), high levels of crime and corruption, and the presence of Islamist entities such as Darul Islam and more virulent regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf Group, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) and others. The impact of JAD and of Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian who had travelled to Syria to join ISIL around 2015 (he was killed in a drone strike in 2018), is still felt in Indonesia, with several JAD fighters surviving the Battle of Marawi and returning to Indonesia. And yet, Australia recognises that the region is also vital to its economic security; the region is home to over 650 million people and a combined GDP of around US$2.5 trillion. This therefore requires a very careful balancing by Australian policymakers, who cannot push the Southeast Asian countries too far as it would likely lead to a severing of the relationship, something that Australian policymakers know that they cannot afford.
In the realm of counterterrorism, there has been much progress between the countries of the region and Australia. The are several reasons for Canberra’s desire to work closely with its neighbours on countering violent extremism. Australia has had to deal with the fall out of Salafi-jihadi radicalisation and the role that it has played in supporting the international coalition against al-Qaeda and ISIL. Australia has faced a failed al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah-guided plot to bomb Israeli and Jewish targets during the 2000 Sydney Olympics, a 2003 Lashkar e-Toiba (LeT) guided terrorism plot, and, a homegrown, albeit al-Shabab inspired attack, targeting Holsworthy Army Barracks in Sydney in 2009. The plots, coupled with Bali and the persistent threat posed by Southeast Asia Salafi-jihadi groups has ensured that Canberra remains engaged with the region, due to fears that Islamist and more worryingly Salafi-jihadi will use the region to establish a base. Second, Australia looks at economic potential of many Southeast Asian countries and of the region as a whole. Third, there are historical connection between Australians and the region, with Australia becoming a home to many people from Southeast Asia, especially Vietnamese and Indonesians.
Canberra has shaped the engagement along four principle lines, which fits with its 2015 counterterrorism strategy: disrupting terrorist activity, ensuring an effective response to and recovery from any terrorist attack, reducing the appeal of violent extremist ideologies, stopping individuals from resorting to violence as a mean to express their views, contribute to the global counterterrorism effort and architecture.
An area that has seen tremendous cooperation between Australia and its regional neighbours is in starving terrorist groups of money, which laid the foundation for a robust counterterrorism finance regime. Over the past 18 years, progress has been made in this space, which Australia has supported, recognising that as early as 2001 in the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, a commitment was made by the member states sign and ratify the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, something that Canberra views as essential which is why AUSTRAC – Australia’s financial intelligence unit – and its various regional partners such as the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, the Bank Negara Malaysia, the Thai Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) have supported four annual counterterrorism finance summits (the first was held in Bali in 2015 followed by meetings in Bali, Kuala Lumpur, and Bangkok). It was through these meetings that Australia supported for the formation of the South East Asia Counter-Terrorism Financing Working Group, with the Australians providing $4.6 million over three years for these initiatives.
Two years after the Bali bombings, the Australian government supported the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), a regional centre that focuses on law enforcement, but with a strong focus on countering terrorism. The Centre, besides offering a unique learning environment has also help improve relations between the Australian Federal Police and the Indonesian National Police. For years, Australia provided the bulk of the funding for the Centre but since 2016, responsibility has increasingly shifted to the Indonesian, in part because Indonesia has adapted to the persistent threat posed by Jemaah Islamiyah and its remnants.
Another important initiative that Australia and the US has supported is the establishment of a specialist anti-terror police unit (Detachment 88, also known as Densus 88), included in the unit is an intelligence component aimed not only at identifying and targeting terrorist groups and cells, but also detecting individuals that are at risk at being radicalised. Included in Densus 88 is a deradicalisation program managed by the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), which focuses primarily on Indonesia’s large prison population. There has also been support for the National Agency for Combating Terrorism and the Directorate General of Correction. The issue however for many Indonesians is that Australia’s approach to radicalisation and terrorism as it pertains to Indonesia misses the point in that Australians want ‘moderate Islam’ and therefore they want policies and initiatives that prevent or redirects the umma away from a version of Islam that they deem as intolerant. For Indonesians the way to deal with radicalisation and terrorism is through a targeted policy aimed at dealing with at risk individuals.
In April 2018, Australia hosted the ASEAN–Australia Special Summit in Sydney. The Summit was meant to highlight the value of ASEAN, specifically concerning the promotion of security, stability, and prosperity while also emphasising the close ties between Australia and its neighbours. The Summit included the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation to Counter International Terrorism, under which Australia agreed to provide technical support to its ASEAN partners in the field of counter-terrorism, including on disrupting terrorist financing, counter-terrorism legislation, and capacity-building initiatives to detect and disrupt terrorist activity. Unsurprisingly, very little public information has been released on what exactly Australia has done to meet many of the ideals encapsulated in the MoU.
An important area that has seen a lot of Australian investment is on addressing the inegalitarian wealth distribution that is pervasive across the region, which is often used as a recruitment tool for violent extremism. Over the last few years, Australia has promoted economic development across the region, with a lot of attention being placed on Indonesia, with such initiative as the Partnership for Food Security, Provincial Road Improvement and Maintenance Program, coupled with support for the construction of pipes aimed at delivering clean water. In part what has driven this engagement is concern over irregular migration, which occupies the minds of many senior policymakers, and another reason, is the need to address some of the drivers for Salafi-jihadi activities. Australian policymakers note the power of economic dislocation, social exclusion, and human rights violations in fuelling extremist narratives.
The ASEAN Way and counterterrorism
Historically, the ASEAN states jealously guard their sovereignty and ensure that they do not encroach on the domestic affairs of other states. This commitment has meant that when it comes to countering terrorist groups and violent extremism, the ASEAN states often struggle as several o have had to contend with bona fide local, terrorist or ethno-nationalist groups, some of whom reach across borders, as seen with Jemaah Islamiyah, and yet they have refused to work with others. Conversely, other states do not have problems with violent extremists and are therefore looking to focus and promote other issues.
In the post-9/11 period, and especially in lieu of the 2002 Bali bombing, the ASEAN member states recognised that a strict adherence to a policy of non-interference prevents them from tackling terrorist group, which is why over the last 15 years the member states have sought to address terrorism domestically through a mixture of security, law enforcement, socio-economic, ideological, and educational policies, albeit in a very slow way. Much of the work has focused on adopting declarations or making statements recognising the threat that terrorism poses to the region and global peace and security.
On a regional level, engagement by the ASEAN countries on counterterrorism began with such announcements as the Joint Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism issued on November 2001, which was followed in November 2002 with the Declaration on Terrorism adopted at the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh. The declaration included a condemnation of the attacks in Bali, and in Zamboanga and Quezon in the Philippines. The declaration was a continuation of the August 2002 a Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism, signed by the ten ASEAN members and the United State, confirming ASEAN’s support of the need to counter transnational terrorism. In May 2002, the member states also adopted the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, which included making several references to counterterrorism components such as the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism (ACPoA on CT), the Working Group on Counter Terrorism (WG on CT), the Working Group on Cybercrime (WG on CC), and the the Senior Officials’ Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC). Even though these measures were light on actual policies, they indicate a sense of regional solidarity as to the need to counter the threat of transnational terrorism. What is significant is that for several years, the ASEAN approach to counterterrorism was to link it to addressing crime and criminal organisations, possibly because it is easier to get a consensus between the members on dealing with transnational crime.
One of the key challenges in looking at counterterrorism and Southeast Asia is that very little information is shared about what is being done regarding counterterrorism on the grounds that there is a need for security, but also because some of the states of the region may not want their people to know if they are getting support from external actors. In a region that does not have strong liberal, democratic credentials, research on terrorist groups and more specifically on counterterrorism is therefore highly challenging.
The revolution in communication and globalisation has impacted the Salafi-jihadi ecosystem in Southeast Asia and they have had to adjust and change because the security services have become better at foiling plots. Nevertheless, the Salafi-jihadi milieu is changing because those that live in it adapt. The technological revolution has had a dual impact on the region. First, it has meant that militants who previously had no access to important manuals are now able to get hold of them. Second, many key Salafi-jihadi manuscripts which are written in Arabic or English are now easily be turned to manuals in Bahasa Indonesia.
The challenge for Australia and the Southeast Asian countries is that they have been successful in foiling plots and they have adopted both soft and hard power measures to deal with the threats posed by Salafi-jihadis, however, these individuals adapt and as things stand it does not seem that states are adopting new measures to deal with the evolving threat environment. Counterterrorism legislation such as the one adopted by Indonesia last year raised questions about executive engagement with civil and political rights. Adopting draconian measures to counter the terrorist threats feeds the extremist narrative, and therefore more work must go in to ensure that reform is introduced to address structural discrimination, lack of investment and corruption, as these factors tend to feed the Salafi-jihadi narrative.
 Seth G. Jones has identified four waves: 1. The 1990s to 2001, al-Qaeda carried out operations away from the American homeland and the wave concluded with the September 11 attack. 2. 2003 to 2006, al-Qaeda carried out or was involved in several operations in Bali, Madrid, London, Casablanca, etc. 3. 2007 and 2011, saw core al-Qaeda having been decimated through primarily drone and Special Operation activity giving way to peripheral groups such as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. 4. 2011, with the death of bin Laden the group has had to reinvent itself and the group has sought to establish a presence in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Somalia, opting to engage with the near enemy. ‘Rebuilding the Base: How Al-Qaida Could Resurge Testimony of Seth G. Jones’, Before the Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence United States House of Representatives, 13 July 2017, online.
 Bart Hogeveen, ‘Is Indonesia catching up in cyberspace?’, The Strategist, 14 February 2018, online; Panca Nugraha, ‘Australia, RI committed to combating terrorism’, The Jakarta Post, 6 August 2018, online.
 Peter Chalk, ‘Black Flag Rising: ISIL in Southeast Asia and Australia,” Strategy, ASPI Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2015, online; Bruce Hoffman, ‘The resurgence of Al-Qaeda’, The Interpreter, 13 March 2018, online; Isaac Kfir, ‘Terrorism in the Indo-Pacific: Glocalism comes of age’, ASPI Special Report, May 2018, online. Andrew Zammit, ‘Which Australian terrorist plots have been directly connected to Islamic State, and how?’, AVERT Research Network, 17 October 2017, online.
 Andrew Zammit, ‘Which Australian terrorist plots have been directly connected to Islamic State, and how?’, AVERT Research Network, 17 October 2017, online; Andrew Zammit, ‘New Developments in the Islamic State’s External Operations: The 2017 Sydney Plane Plot’, The CTC Sentinel, 2017, 10(9):13-19, online.
 James Massola with Reuters, ‘Facebook is the internet for many people in south-east Asia’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 March 2018, online; ‘Reaching the next billion internet users in Southeast Asia’, EDB Sinagpore, 21 November 2017, online.
 The three men were Malaysian Mohamad Rafi Udin, Indonesian Mohammed Karim Yusop Faiz and Filipino Mohammad Reza Lahaman Kiram. Agence France-Presse, ‘US blacklists three Southeast Asians in Islamic State beheading video’, South China Morning Post, 25 August 2018, online.
 Farik Zolkepli, ‘IGP: 7 Filipinos, 1 M’sian nabbed in anti-terror swoops in Putrajaya, Sabah’ The Star Online, 16 November 2018, online; Farik Zolkepli, ‘Eight terror suspects captured’, The Star Online, 17 November 2018, online.
 It is unclear whether they are keen on operations such as the Surabaya bombings. Aman Abdurrahman, the founder of the pro-ISIS Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) has publicly criticised the use of children for such an operation.
 Bruce Hoffman, Al-Qaeda’s resurrection, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 March 2018, online; Bruce Hoffman, ‘The resurgence of Al-Qaeda’, The Interpreter, 13 March 2018, online; Kirsten E Schulze, Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Making Jihadis, Waging Jihad: Transnational and Local Dimensions of the ISIS Phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia’, Asian Security, 2018, doi: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1424710; David Kilcullen, Blood Year: Islamic State and the War on Terror (London: Hurst, 2016); Isaac Kfir, ‘Terrorism in the Indo-Pacific: Glocalism comes of age’, ASPI Special Report, May 2018, online.
 Lindsay Murdoch, ‘Australia’s ‘game-changing’ role against IS in Asia: Turnbull’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 November 2017, online; Isaac Kfir, ‘Australia should rethink its involvement in Marawi’, The Strategist, 27 September 2017, online.
 There has been some excellent work on Salafi-jihadism in Australia, see for example, Shandon Harris-Hogan, ‘Australian neo-jihadist terrorism: Mapping the network and cell analysis using wiretap evidence’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2012, 35(4):298-314. Bart Schuurman, et al. “Operation Pendennis: a case study of an Australian terrorist plot’,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2014, 8(4)91-99; Andrew Zammit, ‘Explaining a turning point in Australian Jihadism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2013, 36(9): 739-755; Shandon Harris-Hogan, Andrew Zammit, ‘The unseen terrorist connection: Exploring jihadist links between Lebanon and Australia.” Terrorism and Political Violence 26.3 (2014): 449-469; Andrew Zammit, ‘Australian Jihadism in the Age of the Islamic State,’ CTC Sentinel, 2017, 10(3):23-30, online;
Peter Chalk, ‘Black Flag Rising: ISIL in Southeast Asia and Australia,” Strategy, ASPI Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2015, online; Bruce Hoffman, ‘The resurgence of Al-Qaeda’, The Interpreter, 13 March 2018, online; Isaac Kfir, ‘Terrorism in the Indo-Pacific: Glocalism comes of age’, ASPI Special Report, May 2018, online. Andrew Zammit, ‘Which Australian terrorist plots have been directly connected to Islamic State, and how?’, AVERT Research Network, 17 October 2017, online.
 Bart Schuurman, Shandon Harris-Hogan, Andrew Zammit, Pete Lentini, ‘Operation Pendennis: A Case Study of an Australian Terrorist Plot’, Perspective on Terrorism, 2014, 8(4), online; Andrew Zammit, ‘The Holsworthy Barracks Plot: A Case Study of an Al-Shabab Support Network in Australia’, The CTC Sentinel, 2012 5(6), online.
 Kate Grealy, ‘Indonesia: countering a message of hate’ The Interpreter, 28 March 2018, online; Cameron Sumpter, ‘Countering youth radicalisation in Indonesia’, The Interpreter, 12 March 2018, online.
 Ralf Emmers (2009) ‘Comprehensive security and resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s approach to terrorism’, The Pacific Review, 22:2, 159-177, DOI: 10.1080/09512740902815300; Kathrin Rucktäschel & Christoph Schuck (2019) ‘An analysis of counterterrorism measures taken by Indonesia since the 2002 Bali bombings’, The Pacific Review, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2019.1627485